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In light of the ageing of the Dutch society, policy measures aim at increasing the participation
rate of elderly workers, particularly in the age-group between 55 and 64. This paper develops a
stylized numerical simulation model describing consumption, savings and labour supply
behaviour over the life cycle to analyze the labour-market implications of such proposals. For
example, we simulate a shift in the (normal) retirement age from 65 to 67, the elimination of the
Social Security premium exemption after age 65, and a premium on ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts if
the commencement date of these beneﬁts is postponed. Each of these reforms affect the
economic outcomes via wealth effects, income effects and inter- and intratemporal substitution
effects. The stylized model offers a profound theoretical underpinning which helps us to
understand these policy effects over the entire life cycle of individuals. However, the numerical
outcomes should be taken with some caution as the model ignores insights of behavioural
economics (such as ‘framing effects’).
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Abstract in Dutch
Als bijdrage aan het beperken van de kosten van de vergrijzing, worden verschillende
maatregelen overwogen om de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van 55-64-jarigen te vergroten. Om de
gevolgen van deze maatregelen voor de arbeidsmarkt te analyseren, wordt in dit paper een
gestileerd numeriek simulatiemodel, gericht op consumptie, besparingen en arbeidsaanbod over
de levenscyclus, ontwikkeld. Wij bekijken onder andere de gevolgen van een verschuiving van
de pensioengerechtigde leeftijd van 65 naar 67 jaar, van ﬁscalisering van de aow en van een
premie op uitstel van de aow-uitkering. Via vermogenseffecten, inkomenseffecten en inter- en
intratemporele substitutie-effecten heeft elk van deze maatregelen invloed op consumptie en
arbeidsaanbod. Het gestileerde model biedt een stevige theoretische onderbouwing waardoor we
deze beleidseffecten over de gehele levenscyclus van individuen kunnen benoemen.
Tegelijkertijd beperkt dit de mogelijkheid om harde conclusies aan de numerieke effecten te
verbinden omdat verschillende mechanismen niet in het model zijn opgenomen. In het bijzonder
betreft dit de inzichten van ‘behavioural economics’ zoals ‘framing effects’.
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6Preface
This document describes the outcomes of a research project through which the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
enabled CPB to participate in the Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement
(Netspar). It develops a life-cycle model for consumption, saving and labour supply, with a
focus on retirement of elderly workers. The model is calibrated using Dutch data on retirement
patterns and used to simulate the impact of a number of institutional changes on life-time labour
supply and discrete labour-market exit.
Compared to other models at CPB, this life-cycle model is unique in describing retirement by
elderly workers. The model is, however, highly stylized in a number of ways, which renders it
less suitable for drawing ﬁrm policy conclusions. For instance, the model is of a partial nature,
only describing household behaviour. Moreover, people are fully rational and forward looking
and only differ in their ability to work beyond the age of 50. Last but not least, compared to
other CPB studies the model ignores insights of behavioural economics. Therefore, the
quantitative effects obtained from the simulations presented in this study may differ from the
CPB’s actual assessment of concrete policy reforms in the Netherlands, as for instance reported
for the Bakker Committee (CPB (2008)). The main contribution of the simulations is therefore
not to produce reliable quantitative effects of policy changes, but rather to gain insight in the key
determinants of life-time labour supply in a stylized economy. The quantitative simulation
outcomes of the present study serve to get a rough idea about the magnitude of various channels
through which policies affect labour-market behaviour.
The model has been constructed and implemented by Frank van Erp and Paul de Hek. Adri den
Ouden en Jan Bonenkamp provided assistance. A steering committee of Sjef Ederveen, Jos
Jansen and Pieter van Winden provided useful guidance to the research and gave valuable
comments on preliminary drafts. The research also beneﬁted from discussions, seminars and




In light of the ageing of the Dutch society, current policy debates partly focus on increasing the
participation rate of elderly workers, particularly in the age-group between 55 and 64. Such
discussions include, for instance, a shift in the age of retirement from 65 to 67, or the elimination
of the age-speciﬁc Social Security premium exemption of elderly. These policy proposals are
likely to affect old-age participation incentives. However, they may also affect people in younger
age-groups as they may anticipate these changed institutional arrangements and adjust their
labour supply, savings and consumption in response. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the
labour-market implications of such proposals requires that the effects on other stages of the life
cycle are taken into account as well. Despite some limitations, life-cycle models provide a
suitable framework for such an analysis.
This paper develops a numerical simulation model describing consumption, savings and labour
supply behaviour over the life cycle of an individual. Regarding labour supply, it distinguishes
between the participation decision (beyond the age 55) and the hours worked decision.
Households differ in their health status after age 50, which explains why people choose different
retirement patterns. The model is calibrated using Dutch data and thus replicates actual
retirement patterns in the Netherlands. Thereby, we also include the actual Dutch institutions
under which people optimize their life-time welfare. By aggregating the discerned groups, the
model also reproduces the age proﬁles of consumption, labour income, ﬁnancial wealth and
retirement as found in the literature. Utility parameters are calibrated so that the model yields
plausible wage and income elasticities of labour supply, as reported in the empirical literature.
The model is used to simulate a number of policy reforms in the Netherlands. These include a
shift in the (normal) retirement age from 65 to 67, the elimination of the Social Security
premium exemption after age 65, the impact of actuarially unfair early retirement beneﬁts, and a
premium on ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts if the commencement date of these beneﬁts is postponed.
These reforms affect the economic outcomes via wealth effects and inter- and intratemporal
substitution effects.
First, wealth effects are caused by (lump-sum) changes in lifetime income. For instance a
higher statutory retirement age reduces the period of receiving lump-sum ﬁrst-tier pension
beneﬁts. This lower lifetime income reduces (lifetime) consumption and leisure and increases
(lifetime) labour supply. In case of balanced budget analysis, the wealth effect is neutralized for
the entire population, although there may be effects on the income distribution among the
distinguished groups.
Second, changes in the (real) effective wage rate (including taxes, Social Security premiums
and pension rights that are linked to labour income) induce both income and substitution effects.
9Indeed, a lower real effective wage rate reduces lifetime income. Yet, it also induces households
to substitute from consumption to leisure. Regarding consumption, income and intratemporal
substitution effects work in the same direction. Regarding leisure, however, income and
intratemporal substitution effects have an opposite sign. Due to the assumed positive labour
supply elasticity, the substitution effect is dominant in our model so that a lower real effective
wage reduces labour supply.
Finally, age-speciﬁc changes in the real effective wage rate induce intertemporal substitution
effects. For instance, the elimination of the age-speciﬁc Social Security premium exemption of
elderly induces households to reallocate labour from pre-65 to post-65 ages and tends to
encourage pre-65 savings.
Armed with these key insights in the model, we can understand how policy reforms affect
life-time labour supply, consumption and saving of individuals. By aggregating over the various
groups distinghuished in the model, we obtain an indication of the size of the aggregate
economic impact. We ﬁnd that acuarially unfair early retirement schemes substantially reduce
the participation rate of elderly workers.
The upward shift of the commencement date of ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts to age 67 does not
result in an equal shift of the retirement age. The reason is that some groups are unable to shift
their retirement age as they already face a constraint at a younger age. Second, some groups
increase their hours worked when younger in order to increase savings and ﬁnancial wealth.
After age 64, this additional ﬁnancial wealth is used to fund retirement in advance of age 67.
This illustrates that individuals may be expected to adjust their labour supply long before they
are affected by the policy change.
An effective policy reform to stimulate labour supply is the abolition of the statutory
retirement age as agreed upon in many collective labour agreements. According to simulations,
this reform will raise especially labour supply in the age group 65-69 as individuals capable of
working will face a higher reward on their effort. Recently, the Dutch government proposed a
5% ﬁnancial rate of return on postponed ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts. As the 5% premium is almost
equal to the combined interest rate and the mortality rate in the model, we ﬁnd that this policy
will have neglible effects on incentives.
Note that the simulation results should be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. First,
with the exception of a probability of death, we neglect uncertainty in the model. Second, agents
are fully rational and the model does not consider aspects emphasized in the behavioural
economics literature. Third, the model only describes the supply side of the labour market and
captures no interactions with demand and keeps wages ﬁxed. Fourth, the model describes the
empirical retirement patterns by just one source of heterogeneity, while various other forms of
heterogeneity may matter, e.g. in ability, education, preferences or cohabitation. Fifth, apart
10from perfect foresight we also assume that the historical time path of individuals agrees with the
optimal path. At each age, shocks - like a global ﬁnancial crisis - may result in a gap between
actual and optimal ﬁnancial wealth of individuals, inducing adjustment of their labour supply
choices. Further research in these directions may teach us how the outcomes of the model would
change, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms.
11121 Introduction
The Dutch population will age considerably over the next 40 years. The proportion of persons
aged 65 and over to the working-age population – the so-called old-age dependency ratio – is
projected to almost double, from 22% in 2000 to 40% in 2050.1 This is likely to have a range of
economic and social consequences. Clearly there will be upward pressure on public spending in
terms of pensions, health and long-term care. To offset some of the pressure that an ageing
population will place on the Dutch economy, the Dutch government aims to increase the
participation of older people in the labour market.
In terms of broad demographic trends, the speed and magnitude of ageing in the Netherlands
is modest compared to most other European countries. Indeed, all European countries aim to
increase the labour-market participation of the elderly and have formulated goals on this in light
of the Lisbon Process. In this connection, various policies are considered by European
governments. For elderly workers, policy reforms focus on the ﬁnancing of (early) retirement
schemes, the mandatory character of retirement savings, the mandatory retirement age,
employment protection (which is especially strict for elderly workers), and other design features
of social insurances (such as unemployment beneﬁt duration that is conditional on employment
history).
It is inherently difﬁcult to assess the economic impact of policies regarding labour market
participation of elderly workers. A policy measure, such as the abolition of early retirement
schemes, will not only affect the persons in the relevant age category, but also change behaviour
at earlier stages of the life course. Moreover, policies aimed at labour market participation will
also affect consumption and saving behaviour. For example, individuals may in anticipation of a
change in early retirement schemes already adjust their consumption, savings, and labour supply
trajectories.
To understand the decision of people regarding exit, or partial exit, from the labour market,
we develop a model that describes the main interactions between institutions, labour-supply
behaviour, and savings. The model is built on a life-cycle framework. In particular, to properly
analyse the time allocation of households over the life cycle, an intertemporal framework that
explores the interactions between savings and labour supply is essential.
This study develops an applied life-cycle framework that can be used to explore a variety of
policies aimed at raising labour supply of the elderly. The model contains heterogeneous agents
who differ according to their health situation over their life cycle. As a result, agents with better
health retire later. This allows us to distinguish between different types of individuals, that (may)
1 OECD (2005)
13react differently to speciﬁc policy measures.
As any model, this model has certain limitations. For example, the model only consists of a
household sector. That is, the role of the demand side is limited to some exogenous restrictions,
ignoring equilibrium dynamics between supply and demand. Another simpliﬁcation concerns
the absence of uncertainty. Agents in the model know exactly what will happen over their entire
life cycle. This, for example, excludes savings for precautionary reasons. Moreover, we assume
that agents are fully rational. This ignores the behavioural aspects as emphasized in the
behavioural economics literature.
Chapter 2 contains a short summary of the literature regarding retirement behaviour in the
context of structural life-cycle models. In particular, we concentrate on (the few) models that
jointly analyse saving and labour supply decisions, including retirement. The studies described
show a variety of explanations for retirement behaviour, like age-dependent preferences, ﬁxed
costs, borrowing constraints, institutional arrangements. In chapter 3 we describe the core of the
applied life-cycle model. This model is an extension of the household sector of the Yaari-model
(Yaari, 1965) which is the standard intertemporal life-cycle model in economic textbooks.
Endogenous labour supply is the main extension to these models. In chapter 3 we also brieﬂy
describe the key features of this extended life-cycle model.2 The calibration procedure is
described in chapter 4. This contains explanations of the strategy, the chosen values of the
parameters and exogenous variables, and the method of aggregation.
The model is used to conduct a number of simulations. In chapter 5 we analyse the economic
effects of several policy proposals to cope with ageing, such as eliminating the exemption of
Social Security premiums after age 65, shifting the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67, and
introducing more ﬂexible pension schemes. Our description of these simulations consists of a
discussion of the incentives underlying the particular policy measure and the resulting aggregate
effects. These effects are obtained with an open budget, concerning both the government and the
pension funds. However, in some cases a balanced budget simulation might be more appropriate.
In order to approximate the economic effects of balanced budget simulations, we conduct two
additional simulations: one regarding a cut in the income tax rate, and one regarding a cut in the
pension premium. The combined effects of one (or both) of these simulations and an open
budget simulation turn out to be a good approximation of the effects of a closed or balanced
budget analysis, either with respect to the government budget or with respect to the budget of the
pension funds (or both).
Chapter 6 contains an agenda for future research. The full model and its technical derivations
are relegated to the appendix which is available on request.
2 See Van Erp and De Hek (2007) for an extensive description of the key features of this model.
142 Related literature
Most studies of saving for retirement take the timing of retirement as given (e.g., Scholz et al.,
2006; Apps and Rees, 2004; Dynan et al., 2004), while studies of the timing of retirement
typically treat accumulated wealth as given (e.g., Rust and Phelan, 1997; Stock and Wise, 1990).
Moreover, most studies estimate their model on the basis of an aggregate employment rate by
age (or the probability that a person is employed at a certain age), which is gradually declining.
As a consequence, they do not explain why individuals often retire from full-time work, without
ﬁrst resorting to part-time work. One way to overcome this problem is to force the agents to
either work full time or not work at all.3
In this chapter we discuss some life-cycle models that are closest to our model. In particular,
we concentrate on (the few) models that jointly analyse saving and labour supply decisions,
including retirement. In doing this, we are mainly interested in the rationale behind the
retirement decision. Why do people retire, when do they retire, and how (abruptly or gradually)?
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) estimate a life-cycle model of retirement and saving, with an
emphasis on (being able to explain the timing of) the retirement decision. At each point in time,
the individual must decide how much to save and whether or not to retire (with exogenous
mortality risk). That is, agents either work full time, half time (partial retirement), or not
(complete retirement). To be able to explain the age 62 retirement spike, individuals are
supposed to have differing rates of time preference (low wealth relative to lifetime earnings
translates into high time preferences, and vice versa). A borrowing constraint restricts assets to
be non-negative. The utility function contains a term which measures the value of leisure relative
to consumption. This term is assumed to be increasing in value as the individual ages and ﬁnds
work more difﬁcult (depending also on health status and cohort). As a result, leisure becomes
more attractive over time, which eventually results in retirement.
The model4 implies that those with high discount rates often retire at 62, the early
entitlement age. Some of these individuals are liquidity constrained and simply cannot afford to
retire before the Social Security beneﬁts become available. In addition, individuals with high
time preference heavily value lost beneﬁts from working after 62, while largely ignoring
potential increases in later beneﬁts. Declining actuarial adjustments beginning at 65 induce those
with low discount rates to retire at 65.
The model is used to examine a rise in the Social Security early entitlement age from 62 to
3 See also Bloom et al. (2006), Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2005).
4 The study analyzes married males who have a ’reasonable’ history of full-time work in their adult lives. The data set is
taken from the Health and Retirement Study, including information on Social Security beneﬁts, pension plans, and their
wife’s income and retirement status. The parameters are estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator. The theoretical moments are simulated (using backward induction).
1564.5 For the same reasons as above – liquidity constrained and/or heavily discounting the future
– this induces 5% of the population to delay retiring, shifting the retirement spike from 62 to 64
(in contrast to French, 2005, see below). That is, the percentage of individuals retiring at age 62
is reduced by (almost) 5 percentage points, whereas the percentage of individuals retiring at age
64 is raised with (almost) 5 percentage points.
Blau (2005) also estimates a life-cycle model in which both consumption and employment are
choices, and the labour supply decision of the agents is restricted to a choice between working
(full time) and not working (retired). The agent in the model is assumed to be a married man
(although behaviour of the spouse is not modeled), and his age ranges between 50 and 100.
Wages are assumed to be constant with respect to age. The agent is not allowed to borrow. He
derives utility from consumption, and leaving assets to one’s wife in the event of death.
Employment yields disutility, affected by the health status of the individual. In addition, the
model includes Social Security retirement and disability programs, employer pensions, a
consumption ﬂoor provided by government welfare programs, stochastic processes for earnings
and asset returns, layoff risk, job offer risk, health risk, and mortality risk. Ex ante, agents are
the same, ex post, agents differ due to different realizations of the shocks.
The issue examined here is whether the model6 can generate simulated consumption and
retirement behaviour that resembles the general patterns of behaviour found in the data. In
particular, the study focuses on explaining the drop in consumption at retirement, without
resorting to non-separable preferences.7 Concerning the employment proﬁle, the changes in the
slope of the age-employment relationship, indicating periods of increased retirement, are mostly
due to Social Security and pension incentives in the model. Health status changes smoothly with
age, inducing smooth changes in employment probability. That is, participation slowly declines
before 62, the early retirement age, and after 70, the maximum social security entitlement age,
mainly due to changes in health and adverse realizations of the shocks (e.g., low wage rates,
unemployment). Between 62 and 70, retirement is mainly driven by the (actuarial unfair) Social
Security and employer-provided pension beneﬁts.
Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2006) aim to forecast the impact of changes in the Social Security
program. For this reason, they develop and estimate a model of retirement and savings8,
incorporating limited borrowing, stochastic wage offers, health status and survival, Social
5 This simulation assumes that the employer-provided pension plans will not change.
6 The model is calibrated to data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The model solution was used to simulate
life-cycle trajectories for 10,000 artiﬁcial agents.
7 The ﬁndings suggest that the combination of uncertainty and choice of retirement date is critical for generating a drop in
consumption at retirement.
8 The model is estimated on a sample of relatively poor households from the ﬁrst three waves of the HRS.
16Security beneﬁts, Medicare and employer provided health insurance coverage, and intentional
bequests. In addition, they model the joint labour supply decision of married couples, and
include expectations over changes in Social Security policy. Hours worked, if positive, is
allowed to take two values, part-time hours or full-time hours. Employment choices are further
restricted in that all individuals are assumed to stop working (permanently) at age 75. Individuals
become eligible to apply for Social Security at age 62. Postponement of ﬁrst receipt of beneﬁts
increases beneﬁts by some percentage (depending on age). Health status, which is assumed to be
either good or poor, affects the parameters in the utility function. Estimates imply that the
marginal utility of consumption is smaller, and the marginal disutility of hours of work is greater
for those in poor health. The transition from work to retirement is caused by declining wages,
rising Social Security beneﬁts, and changes in health status. The estimated model forecasts large
and heterogeneous behavioural responses in reaction to changes in Social Security rules.
French (2005) estimates a life-cycle model of labour supply, retirement, and savings behaviour.
The agent chooses both hours of work and retirement (participation). Future health status and
wages are uncertain. Individuals can save to insure themselves against health and wage shocks
as well as for retirement, but cannot borrow against future labour, Social Security, and pension
income to smooth consumption in the face of an adverse shock. The analysis9 focuses on men
aged 30-95. Hourly wages follow a hump-shaped pattern, while part-time workers earn less per
hour than full-time workers. Health is either good or bad. Bad health reduces the available time
for work and leisure. Declining wages, deteriorating health and large pension and Social
Security work disincentives push hours worked downwards. Retirement occurs if the desired
level of hours worked falls below the level determined by the ﬁxed costs of work. The model
establishes that the tax structure and the actuarial unfairness of Social Security and pensions are
key determinants of the high observed job exit rates at ages 62 and 65. In French (2005), pension
eligibility is not a choice variable. Rather, he assumes that all individuals begin drawing pension
beneﬁts at age 62. This explains the large impact of the tax structure on labour supply at age 62,
as many people would be pushed into higher tax brackets if they continued to work.
The model is used to conduct three simulations: (i) shifting the early retirement age from 62
to 63, (ii) a 20% reduction in Social Security beneﬁts, and (iii) eliminating the tax wedge caused
by the Social Security earnings test. Simulations from the model indicate that shifting the early
Social Security retirement age to 63 would leave years in the labour force largely unchanged.
This is explained by the next two facts. First, total beneﬁts are largely unaffected, as
recomputation formulae almost fully replace beneﬁts lost. Thus, there is no wealth effect.
9 The paper uses the method of simulated moments to match life-cycle proﬁles (labour force participation, hours worked,
and assets) estimated using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to life-cycle proﬁles generated by a dynamic
programming model. This produces estimates of preference parameters such as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the time discount factor.
17Second, borrowing constraints bind for very few individuals at age 62, implying that only these
very few individuals are forced to retire later, when Social Security beneﬁts become available.
Removing the tax wedge would delay job exit by almost one year. This reduction in the tax
rate after 65 will increase lifetime wealth. The wealth effect will lead individuals to take more
leisure. However, the substitution effect from this tax reduction causes individuals to raise hours
worked after age 65. The substitution effect clearly dominates, inducing years in the labour force
to rise by approximately one year.
By contrast, the 20% reduction in Social Security beneﬁts would cause workers to delay exit
from the labour force by only three months. This delay involves both a wealth and a substitution
effect that work in the same direction. First, the loss of Social Security beneﬁts causes a loss of
lifetime wealth. This results in individuals working more hours throughout their lives, as they
consume less leisure given the loss of wealth. Second, the policy measure also effectively
reduces the high marginal tax rates of the earnings test. The associated substitution effect causes
individuals to work more hours when eligible for Social Security beneﬁts and fewer hours at
younger ages.
183 The life-cycle model
3.1 Introduction
Our starting point is the standard life-cycle model as in Yaari (1965) and Hurd (1989). This
model yields predictions of consumption and labour supply trajectories of individuals over their
life-cycle. Section 3.2 starts with a description of the utility function, and describes the
constraints that are active in the model. Section 3.3 focuses on institutions or policy variables
like taxes, Social Security and the pension system. Finally, the key features of the model are
described in section 3.4.
3.2 Utility function
Following the standard life-cycle model with lifetime uncertainty and (real) bequests, the
(remaining) lifetime utility for a person with a current age of s years and a (maximum) ﬁnite






















γ , γ > 0, γ 6= 1, (3.2)
where ρ is the rate of time preference used for discounting the future, ξt,s denotes the probability
that the individual of age s will be alive at time t, and mt,s is the mortality rate at time t:
mt,s = (ξt,s −ξt+1,s). Notice that t is an age index. Lifetime utility consists of two parts. The
ﬁrst term in the right hand side of equation (3.1) describes the utility – when alive – derived from
consumption c and leisure v, consisting of a CRRA utility function10 as described in equation
(3.2). The parameter γ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the composite good
x, consisting of the CES nest of consumption and leisure. The second term in the right hand side
of equation (3.1) refers to the bequest motive. The desire to leave real bequests (at
˜ pt , to one’s
children, to other family members or to charity) is a potential explanation of the (substantial)
amount of assets that people hold when they die. This particular type of (impure) altruism,
commonly referred to as "warm glow preferences", assumes that parents derive utility from their
bequests, rather than from the utility of their offspring. With respect to the functional form, we
follow De Nardi (2004) and Ameriks et al. (2007) in parameterizing the bequest utility with two
parameters: ω, controlling the strength of the bequest motive, and φ, measuring the degree to
10 Constant Relative Risk Aversion



















where α is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of bequests, a end of period (nominal
value of) private ﬁnancial wealth and ˜ p the consumption price.
In each period t the utility derived from consumption and leisure is described by a CES-function
















σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1. (3.4)
The preference parameters µc and µv measure the relative weights of consumption and leisure in
utility.11 The functional form of the utility function differs with the ones in French (2005) and
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). We use a combination of CRRA- and CES-functions, while
French (2005) assumes CRRA- and Cobb-Douglas functions and Gustman and Steinmeier
(2005) use additive CRRA-functions.
Utility is maximised subject to a time and a budget constraint, resulting in optimal choices of
leisure, labour supply and consumption. In addition, the model contains the opportunity to
impose a borrowing contraint.
The time constraint reads
vt +lt +dtlt = lmax lt ≥ 0, (3.5)
where lt represents hours of work. In general, the total amount of time available in a given
period, as represented by lmax, can be divided between working and non-working time. In the
present model, non-working time in turn consists of time spent on leisure which generates utility,
and time related to work that does not generate utility nor income. The latter non-working time
contains e.g. travel time to and from work, and time needed to rest or recover from work. The
amount of time spent in this way may depend on hours of work, that is, the more hours you work
the more time you need to recover from work. This mechanism is captured in the (exogenous)
variable dt, representing a time surcharge on labour.12
As shown in the box (below), the variable dt has also a preference interpretation. The same
patterns of labour supply and consumption can be obtained by simultaneous changes in the
11 In this paper, we ignore the possibility of minimum consumption or minimum leisure.
12 Alternatively, this amount of time depends on labour supply participation only, unaffected by hours of work. In Van Erp
and De Hek (2007) this is captured in the variable lt,fixed, i.e. ﬁxed labour costs. Fixed costs are also used by French
(2005) to describe retirement behaviour. In this paper, we set these ﬁxed costs to zero, and instead include a minimum
labour supply constraint (see below).
20parameters of the utility function. This interpretation is in line with the increasing disutility of
work (depending on health status and/or age) as applied by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005),
Blau (2005), and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2006).
Alternative interpretation of dt
An alternative interpretation of dt arises when the utility function is rewritten as

















σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1. (3.6)
with
˜ vt = vt +dtlt (3.7)





This shows that dt has also a preference interpretation. The same patterns of labour supply and consumption can be
obtained by simultaneous changes in ˜ µv, the relative weight of leisure, and vt,min, the minimum amount of leisure needed.
In addition to the time constraint, we impose a minimum labour supply constraint. Agents are
thus not allowed to work less than some minimum amount of hours per year, i.e.,
lt ≥ lmin (3.10)
This restriction is imposed on the workers by the employers. Notice that we assume continuous
labour supply, restricted by a lower bound and an upper bound.
The budget constraint follows from the accumulation of wealth13,
at = (1+rh
t )at−1+(wtlt +aowt + pbt)− pst − ppt −taxt − ˜ ptct, (3.11)
where at is end of period wealth, wt the nominal wage rate (which may vary over time), aowt
ﬁrst-tier pension (state) beneﬁts, pbt second-tier pension beneﬁts, pst Social Security premiums
employees’insurance, ppt pension premiums, taxt income tax and ˜ pt the price of the
consumption good including consumption taxes. This price is deﬁned by
˜ pt = (1+τc)pt (3.12)
where τc is the consumption tax and ˜ pt the price of the consumption good (which may also vary
over time).
13 In this paper, we ignore unemployment and associated unemployment beneﬁts, as well as other early retirement
schemes and income transfers between households and other sectors.





wt,1 if t <tret
wt,2 if t ≥tret
(3.13)
Regarding both wage rates we assume a wage proﬁle. The wage rate of the ﬁrst job gradually
increases up to the age of 50 years by almost 1% per year. Thereafter it remains stable until the
age of quitting this (ﬁrst) job. Next, the wage rate in the second job is lower than the wage rate
of the preceding job and gradually declines.
The relevant interest rate on private ﬁnancial wealth, rh
t , is the difference between the
nominal interest rate and the tax rate on ﬁnancial wealth. So, deﬁned by
1+rh
t = (1+r −τa) (3.14)
where r is the nominal interest rate (assumed to be constant) and τa the tax rate on wealth.14
In terms of institutions, the current model contains
1. State pension (aowt, ﬁrst-tier of pension system)
2. Private pension (pbt, second-tier of pension system)
3. Pension premiums (ppt)
4. Taxes and Social Security premiums on current income (taxt, pst)
End of period wealth (at), then is equal to wealth at the end of the preceding period (at−1), plus
the net revenues of wealth (rh
t at−1), plus current income (wtlt +erst +aowt + pbt) minus
pension premiums (ppt), minus taxes and Social Security contributions on current income (taxt),
and minus consumption ( ˜ ptct). Current income consists of wage income (wtlt), pension beneﬁts
paid by the government (aowt) and pension beneﬁts paid by pension funds (pbt), if applicable.
In section 3.3 we will discuss these elements more extensively.
Imperfect ﬁnancial markets enter the model through the opportunities to impose a borrowing
contraint. The most used form, also applied by French (2005), Gustman and Steinmeier (2005),
and Blau (2005), is
at−1 ≥ 0 for t ≥ s (3.15)
That is, we impose that agents are not allowed to borrow during their whole life span. This is
particularly relevant in the presence of a mandatory pension system. The presence of a
(sufﬁciently strong) bequest motive, in addition, implies that this borrowing constraint tends to
be more pressing for the young.





are not included in the relevant interest rate. In some related literature (e.g.,
Yaari, 1965) these probabilities are incorporated in the interest rate and reﬂect the presence of life-insurance or annuity
markets, where competitive life insurance ﬁrms make payments to individuals (as a function of their asset levels) in return
for receiving their positive assets when they die. However, these annuity markets and life-insurances do not exist in the
real world and are inconsistent with the distribution of bequests among housholds.
223.3 Institutions
To analyse the retirement behaviour, the model contains several institutional arrangements,
including the pension system and the tax system. The pension system distinguishes between
early retirement pension, state pension (ﬁrst-tier) and private pension (second-tier beneﬁts).
State pension is funded by Social Security premiums and/or taxes. Private pension is ﬁnanced by
mandatory pension premiums. These institutional beneﬁts and taxes are discussed in the next
sections.
3.3.1 Mandatory retirement
We distinguish two types of jobs. The ﬁrst job is the main job, which provides the agent with a
pension. After the agent retires from his main job, and starts to receive pension beneﬁts, he may
choose to take a second job. The (net) wage rate associated with this second job, however, is
substantially lower than the (net) wage rate belonging to the main job – even after Social
Security contributions are dropped. There are two reasons behind this supposed drop in wages.
First, this may reﬂect the falling productivity of the elderly. This is not reﬂected in the wage rate
of the main job, suggesting that wages of the elderly are higher than their productivity,15 but
manifests itself once the agent takes a new job. A second explanation of the wage drop is a loss
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital that may occur if a person changes jobs.
Agents are not allowed to work in their main job after the statutory retirement age. That is,
once they reach the statutory retirement age, and are still at work in their main job, they face a
compulsory dismissal.16
3.3.2 State pension
Reﬂecting current Dutch institutions, the retirement beneﬁt paid by the government (aow) is
speciﬁed by a ﬁxed beneﬁt after achieving a speciﬁc age (tpa,1). These beneﬁts are lump-sum





0 if t <tpa,1
δ if t ≥tpa,1
(3.16)
15 Discrepancies between wage and productivity over the life cycle may arise for different reasons, for example due to the
presence of implicit contracts. See e.g. De Hek and Van Vuuren (2008).
16 In the Netherlands almost all collective labour agreements provide an opportunity to employers to dismiss employees at
a particular age, often 65, without paying a dismissal allowance. In fact employment protection is (temporarily) elevated at
this age. Although dismissal at this particular age is not obliged, in practice the majority of employers lays off its
employees at this age. Therefore, from the perspective of employees, this age acts as an age of compulsory dismissal.
17 In this respect this speciﬁcation differs from French (2005) where beneﬁts paid by the Social Security system depend
on the retirement age and historical labour income. Equation (3.16) is actually a simpliﬁed version of the speciﬁcation in
our model. In order to assess the effects of some proposals put forward in the policy debate, we include a premium
related to a prolonged participation in the labour market and a delayed commencement date of the state pension. This
extended speciﬁcation is written in the appendix which is available on request.
23These beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by Social Security contributions (see section 3.3.4).
3.3.3 Private pension
The retirement beneﬁt paid by the pension funds (pb) is determined by a deﬁned beneﬁt pension
system.18 Pension premiums are proportional to labour income minus an age-independent
franchise (fp), with a minimum amount of zero. Premiums are paid until the age of receiving
second-tier pension beneﬁts (tpb,2). Furthermore, related to Dutch institutions, we assume a
common pension premium. Note, the combination of a common pension premium and the
deﬁned beneﬁt pension scheme results in an actuarial unfair pension scheme. In addition, for the





τpmax{0,wtlt − fp} if t ≤tpb,2−1 and t ≤tret −1
0 if t >tpb,2 or t >tret −1
(3.17)
At the end of each year pension rights are equal to the pension rights at the end of the preceding
year plus an accrual deﬁned by an appropriate interest rate (r
p f
t ), the accrual of pension rights in
year t (pot), minus paid pension beneﬁts in year t (pbt):
apt = (1+r
p f
t )apt−1+ pot − pbt (3.18)







Here, in contrast to the ﬁnancial markets for private ﬁnancial wealth, the relevant interest rate
does include mortality rates as deceased participants of the pension scheme leave their pension
rights to the remaining members. Furthermore, notice that the yield on pension wealth is not
taxed.
The accrual of pension rights (pot) in principle takes place until the time of withdrawal from
the ﬁrst job (t <tret), unless individuals are provided with the possibility to advance the
commencement date of receiving pension beneﬁts (t <tpb,2). In the present case of a deﬁned
beneﬁts scheme the accrual of rights is equal to the present value of the growth of promised
pension beneﬁts. Assuming an annual growth of β of the labour income, this present value is





ppt if pension system is deﬁned contribution, t <tpb,2 and t <tret
βwtltD2,t if pension system is deﬁned beneﬁt , t <tpb,2 and t <tret
0 if t <tpb,2 and t ≥tret
(3.20)











18 In addition, the model offers the opportunity to introduce alternative pension systems, such as deﬁned contribution.
24where tpa,2 is the pivot age of the (deﬁned beneﬁt) pension scheme.
Payments of second-tier retirement beneﬁts (pbt) by pension funds starts at age tpb,2.
Usually, and in the baseline scenario, this age is equal to the age an individual stops working in
his ﬁrst job (tret). The pension fund then imposes the amount of total pension beneﬁts, which
consists of a ﬁxed annuity during the period of retirement (pb
g
tpb,2). This annuity level, in which
the ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts starting at age tpb,1 are incorporated, follows from the equivalence
between the present value of future retirement beneﬁts and the available pension rights,
including the present value of ﬁrst-tier pension rights (apaow
































The amount actually paid by second-tier pension funds (pbt) depends on the sequence of the
commencement dates of ﬁrst and second tier pension beneﬁts (tpb,1, tpb,2). Second tier pension
beneﬁts are adjusted over time to smooth total pension income of households. That is, if
individuals receive simultaneously both ﬁrst and second-tier pension beneﬁts, second-tier
beneﬁts are equal to the difference between total (pb
g
tpb,2) and ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts (aowt).
If ﬁrst-tier pensions beneﬁts are not yet received, the pension funds temporarily pay the ﬁxed
annuity (pb
g
tpb,2) and, from the commencement date of ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts on, the
difference between total and ﬁrst-tier beneﬁts. Thus,
pbt =

           
           
0 if t <tpb,2 and tpb,2 ≤tpb,1
pb
g
tpb,2 if tpb,2 ≤t <tpb,1 and tpb,2 ≤tpb,1
pb
g
tpb,2 −aowt if tpb,1 ≤t ≤ T and tpb,2 ≤tpb,1
0 if t <tpb2 and tpb,2 >tpb,1
pb
g
tpb,2 −aowt if tpb,2 ≤t ≤ T and tpb,2 >tpb,1
(3.25)
These speciﬁcations of the pension system deviate slightly from French (2005) and Gustman and
Steinmeier (2005). In our model the age of retirement is endogenous and the pension beneﬁt is
related to that age. In Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) the pension beneﬁts are exogenous.
French (2005) imposes the retirement age regarding pensions at 62 years. Only the time
individuals begin drawing from the state pension is endogenous.
253.3.4 Taxation and Social Security premiums
In this basic set-up we distinguish three sources of taxation.19 Taxes are levied on current
income, the stock of wealth, and consumption. Taxes on consumption and wealth are already
discussed in section 3.2 as part of the budget constraint. Taxes on current income are
proportional, as captured by the rate τy,t. Notice that the tax rate on current income is dependent
on age. This allows us to use the model for age-dependent policy simulations such as ﬁnancing
the ﬁrst tier of the Dutch pension system. Total taxes (taxt) consist of a proportional income tax
(τy) and Social Security contributions (τaow). The taxable income20 encompasses labour income
(wl) and retirement beneﬁts paid by state (aow) and pension funds (pb). Pension premiums
(pp) and Social Security premiums for employees’ insurances are tax-deductible. Social





(τy + τaow)tax_baset if t <taow
(τy)tax_baset if t ≥taow
(3.26)
with
tax_baset = wtlt +aowt + pbt − pst − ppt (3.27)
Social Security premiums for national insurances are part of the tax system. Social Security
premiums for employees’ insurances are speciﬁed separately and, up to age tss, proportional to





τs max{0,wtlt − ppt} if t <tss
0 if t ≥tss
(3.28)
where τs is the Social Security premium rate for employees’ insurances.
3.4 Key features
The model described in the preceding sections results in a set of key equations that describe the
growth of marginal utilities (equations (3.29) and (3.30)), the growth of consumption
(equation (3.31), the growth of leisure (equation (3.32)) and the ratio between marginal utilities







19 In Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) taxation is omitted. French (2005) distinguishes only income taxes.
20 We neglect the impact of institutional differences between employee insurances and Social Security insurances.






















In this particular case, including the retirement decision, the pension system, variable labour


















































































with It[s,tret −1] an indicator function reﬂecting the minimum hours constraint (lt ≥ lmin)
regarding the ﬁrst job.
The variable ˜ wt, as deﬁned by equation (3.39), is the effective (marginal) net wage rate. The
marginal net wage rate is equal to the gross wage rate times one minus the (marginal) income tax
(τ 0
y), marginal Social Security premiums employees’ insurances (τ 0
s) and (marginal) pension
premium (τ 0
p). The effective marginal net wage rate adjusts the net wage rate by taking care of
the (maginal) revenues of the pension system (po0
wtlt) , the minimum hours worked constraint
(ηtIt[s,tret −1]), and the time surcharge on labour (dt). Basically, the effective marginal net
wage rate is the total compensation of supplying one hour of labour. The variable Dt represents
the effective marginal net real wage rate, the ratio between the effective marginal net wage rate
and the (marginal) consumption price including consumption taxes. Below, we clarify these key
equations.
The (gross) growth rates of the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, Yc,t and Yv,t,
mainly depend on the ratio between the rate of time preference (ρ) and an appropriate deﬁned
27real net interest rate. Notice that the deﬂator of the real interest rate differs between consumption
and leisure.22
The growth rates of consumption and leisure, in turn, depend on these growth rates of
marginal utilities, together with the effective net real wage rates in the two periods (through Gc,t
and Gv,t). The direction of the impact of the effective net real wage on the growth rates of
consumption and leisure depends on the relative magnitudes of the intertemporal rate of
substitution (γ) and the intratemporal rate of substitution (σ). If σ > γ consumption and leisure
are substitutes and a rise in the real net wage rate leads to more consumption, less leisure and
more labour supply. If σ < γ consumption and leisure are complements and a rise in the
effective net real wage rate leads to less consumption, less leisure and more labour supply.
The presence of a time surcharge on labour, dt, results in a proportional discount of the
effective net wage rate. The pension system results in tax-deductible pension premiums,
(1−τ 0
y,t)τp. Money spent on pension premiums is not wasted, but yields pension beneﬁts while
retired. The value the agent attaches to pension savings is reﬂected in the shadow price ζ. As
explained in appendix23, ζt measures the relative utility of pension savings compared to private
savings. Depending on the distortions of the pension system (absence of a tax on the yields of
pension wealth on the one hand, the possible inﬂuence of the borrowing constraint on the other
hand), ζ will be larger or smaller than 1−τ 0
y,t. As a result, the pension premium may reduce or
enhance the effective net wage rate. In addition, as witnessed by the term Dtp,t, a DB pension
system causes the effective wage rate to increase over time, until retirement is reached (and
pension premiums are stopped being paid). This reﬂects the fact that pension build-up is a ﬁxed
fraction of income at the pension pivot age, implying that later paid premiums have higher yields.
The fact that hours worked are bounded below (by lmin) yields a shadow price of labour
represented by the surcharge ηt.
Finally, in the presence of a borrowing constraint the free-choice optimal dynamic path of
consumption and leisure (labour supply) is affected by the surcharge θt in order to fulﬁll the
borrowing constraint.
The above equations describe the intertemporal allocation of goods and time (growth paths). The
choices of consumption and leisure within a certain period, i.e. the intratemporal decisions








Together with the lifetime budget constraint, this determines the initial levels of consumption and
22 This difference in deﬂator is related to the value of postponing a unit of consumption (consumption price pt) or leisure
(wage rate wt). In the case consumption is postponed, the additional wealth in the next period is (1+r)pt and available
for (1+r)
pt
pt+1 additional consumption goods. If leisure is postponed, the additional wealth in the next period is (1+r)wt
and yields (1+r) wt
wt+1 additional hours of leisure.
23 This appendix is available on request
28leisure. The effect of the level of the wage rate on the (initial, or average) level of labour supply,
i.e. hours worked, depends on the relative strenghts of the substitution effect and the income
effect. At σ = 1 both effects exactly cancel, and labour supply is unresponsive of the real wage.
The substitution effect dominates if σ > 1, while the income effect is relatively stronger if σ < 1.
Finally, the assumed utility function implies a link between the marginal utility of consumption
and the marginal utility of bequest. This link is immediately evident at the end of the time
horizon (T). Assuming that labour supply is nil at T 24, individuals allocate the available
ﬁnancial wealth at the start of the ﬁnal period among consumption and bequests. So, in
equilibrium marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal utility of bequests and an
increase in marginal utility of consumption due to a fall in the level of consumption, requires a
fall in bequest at T too. That is, in equilibrium, a lower level of consumption is associated with a
lower level of bequest. Or considered from an intuitive point of view: individuals with a small
consumption (due to small lifetime income) prefer leaving small bequests.
In earlier periods t (t < T) an almost similar link exist. Main difference is the inﬂuence of
consumption at t on all future bequests up to T. After all, reducing consumption at time t with
one unit, not only increases end of period ﬁnancial wealth at t, but also increases ﬁnancial wealth
in all future periods. Taken into account the (real net) interest rate, the effect on ﬁnancial wealth
in future periods will be larger or smaller than the change in consumption at time t. Finally, the
survival rates (and mortality rates) and the rate of time preference affect the link between
marginal utility of consumption and marginal utility of bequests.25
24 For instance as the variable labour costs (dt) are very large or the nominal wage rate is almost nil.
25 Assuming the real net interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference and assuming no effect of the borrowing
constraint, the marginal utility of consumption at time t is equal to the sum of the expected marginal utilities of bequests




In order to obtain an applied life-cycle model suitable for policy purposes in the Dutch economy,
the aforementioned model has to be estimated or calibrated on Dutch data. However, a full and
mutual consistent set of data of consumption, income, wealth, labour supply and retirement is
not available. Therefore, the calibration has to be more tentative and limited to the reproduction
of some (empirical) stylized facts using plausible values for the structural parameters. Regarding
the stylized facts we focus on
1. Empirical retirement patterns
2. Labour supply elasticity
3. Age-proﬁles of consumption, income and wealth
In the next section, we will describe these stylized facts in more detail. Thereafter, we focus on
the applied strategy to explain the variety in retirement ages. Taking into account the economic
literature, Section 4.4 presents a survey of the imposed parameter values for utility function,
institutions etcetera. After discussing the aggregation of individuals towards macroeconomic key
ﬁgures, we brieﬂy compare the results of the model with the stylized facts.
4.2 Stylized facts
4.2.1 Participation and retirement behaviour
Dutch data show an increasing participation of man and women until the ages of 25-27 years
(see ﬁgure 4.1). Between 27 years and 50 years, the participation of man remains stable, while
the participation of women gradually falls. After reaching the age 50, the participation of both
man and women decreases rapidly, with a sharp fall at the age of 60-61 years.
A similar picture arises from Corpeleijn (2007) regarding the outﬂow of the labour market.
Figure 3 (page 33) shows an increasing outﬂow of labour after 55 years of age, with peaks at the
ages of 60-61 and 65.
4.2.2 Empirical labour supply elasticities
The elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage rate plays a critical role in the response
of labour supply on many policy measures. A large number of studies have estimated the
(uncompensated) elasticity of labour supply (see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). 26 These
26 The uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is deﬁned as the percentage change in hours worked as a result
of a one percent change in the net hourly wage rate.


















Source: Statistics Netherlands, Labour force survey 2007.
studies show a great deal of variation both in results and in approaches to estimate the elasticity.
Evers et al. (2008) uses this variation in study characteristics to analyze the systematic impacts
of the many factors on reported empirical estimates. In particular, using a sample of 209
uncompensated labour supply elasticities obtained from the literature, they perform a meta
analysis, regressing the elasticities on the underlying study characteristics. On the basis of this
meta regression, the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply for Dutch men is estimated
to be around 0.1. The corresponding ﬁgure for woman is 0.5.
4.2.3 Age proﬁles
Using data of the Socio Economic Panel (SEP), Alessie et al. (1997) investigated the wealth and
income proﬁles of Dutch households in 1987-1989. The panel, a representative sample of the
Dutch population, contains approximately 5,000 households. On average, the results indicate a
hump-shaped proﬁle of both labour income and of total income (consisting of labour income,
transfers and capital income). Total income, for example, sharply increases between 20 and 30
years of age and subsequently shows a moderate increase until around the age of 50 - 55.
Thereafter, income gradually falls.27
Financial wealth (excluding pension wealth and present value of state pensions) also follows
a hump-shaped proﬁle. Until the ages 60 - 65 ﬁnancial wealth increases. Thereafter a mitigated
27 See Alessie et al. (1997), ﬁgure 5a, page 19.
32fall appears. However, looking at the individual data of the panel, the proﬁles of ﬁnancial wealth
show a large variety. For instance, at least 50% of the households does not dissave until the age
of 80 years.28
Using data of the CBS Budget survey (about 2,000 households per year from 1978 to 2000)
De Ree and Alessie (2005) construct life-cycle patterns for consumption and income based on
birth cohort averages. Both wealth and household consumption display a hump-shape proﬁle.
However, if adjusted for household composition, Dutch consumption seems to be almost
constant over the life-cycle.29
The observed hump-shaped pattern in Dutch income and wealth proﬁles also appears in
US-studies. For instance Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001) show a hump-shaped pattern
in wealth. In another paper Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) looked at consumption
proﬁles and found a hump-shaped pattern for household consumption. If household composition
is taken into account, the hump in the consumption proﬁle falls by around 50%.
Lambert and Pignatti (2007) compare consumption, income and wealth proﬁles between Italy
and the US. For their analysis the authors use data of the Italian Survey of Household Income
and Wealth and of the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Similar to Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger, Lambert and Pignatti ﬁnd a hump-shaped proﬁle in the US data for consumption,
income and wealth. However, looking at the Italian data, the proﬁles seem to be much ﬂatter.
Institutional differences between the US and Italy, especially concerning the pension systems,
seem to be the most important causes of the differences in the observed proﬁles.
4.3 Strategy to explain variety in retirement ages
To explain the variety in retirement ages we choose one element of the model to differ between
individuals. This is the variable dt, the time surcharge on labour, measuring the variable labour
costs, dtlt. These variable labour costs are measured in terms of time, as witnessed by its
appearance in the time constraint (equation (3.5)). As apparent from equation (3.39), increasing
dt over time results in a declining effective real wage proﬁle, inducing the agent to opt for a
declining labour supply proﬁle.30 We assume that continuing increases in dt are caused by
deteriorating health. Health, then, is the job-related physical and/or mental condition that affects
the (complete) time needed to do the job. Or, in the alternative interpretation of dt, it affects the
28 See Alessie et al. (1997), ﬁgure 3b, page 15.
29 See De Ree and Alessie (2005), ﬁgure 2, page 18.
30 This follows from inserting equation (3.39) in equation (3.35), which feeds in equation (3.32).
33preferences with respect to leisure (and, consequently, consumption). The faster dt rises, the
faster the effective real wage falls, and the sooner the agent retires.
In a sense, we describe desired hours worked over the life cycle. Of course, we observe that
many people do not gradually reduce hours worked before retirement. Traditionally, individuals
work full-time or part-time until a given age and then stop working abruptly. From a life-cycle
perspective, however, it seems intuitively attractive to have a smooth transition from work to
retirement, gradually reducing the number of hours worked.31 The fact that gradual retirement is
not common suggests that workers face restrictions if they want to reduce their work effort.
From the demand side, employers are often reluctant to create opportunities for gradual
retirement. Reasons for this reluctance include ﬁxed employer costs, team production, and the
preservation of job-speciﬁc skills. Finally, from the supply side, employees may face ﬁxed costs
(eg. travelling time). Finally, institutional arrangements concerning pension- and/or Social
Security beneﬁts may also contribute in the discouragement of gradual retirement. In this paper
we largely abstract from these restrictions and focus on the preferred smooth transition from
work to retirement.32





δ0 if t = 25,...,Th −1
δ0+δ1(t −Th)2 if t = Th,...,T
(4.1)
The parameter δ0 is the same for all individuals. The heterogeneity stems from the parameter δ1,
the rate at which dt rises. We assume that δ1 follows a certain probability distribution. This
distribution, then, determines the distribution of retirement ages. As the latter is known from the
data, we use these data to infer the distribution of δ1-values. For computational reasons we
assume a discrete distribution of δ1-values. The drawback of this assumption is that groups of
individuals are bundled together, making the size of the group the unit of account.33 Thus, the
sizes of the groups are chosen as small as possible (to approach the continuous distribution) to
the extent that the associated number of groups is computationally feasible (i.e., calibration and
simulation do not take too much time). We use a criterion (see below) to make the distribution
sufﬁciently smooth.
The ﬁrst step in the calibration procedure involves the determination of δ1-ranges. Each range of
δ1 values leads to a different retirement age. The parameters of the model are chosen such that
the individual chooses to leave the labour force at age 75 if δ1 ≥ 0. Increases in δ1 will
31 This is conﬁrmed by Soest et al. (2006), which examines preferences for gradual retirement in the Netherlands.
32 In future work, to take the restrictions into account, we may restrict the hours worked decision (e.g. between full-time,
part-time, and not working, discrete choice model).
33 That is, in response to a policy measure the whole group decides to adjusts the retirement age or not.
34subsequently trigger earlier retirement ages. These δ1-ranges are determined for each retirement
age from 75 until 55, as the vast majority of the people retire between these ages.
Each range, then, is represented by n (one or more) speciﬁc δ1-values.34 The number of speciﬁc
values within a range, n, depends on the size of the fraction of people that fall within that range.
The higher the fraction of people, the higher n, limiting the amount of people represented by one
speciﬁc δ1-value. The criterion we use to determine n, and hence the smoothness of the
distribution of δ1-values, is that the fraction of individuals represented by one δ1-value is not
more than 2.5%. In this way we create many different types of individuals35, each type
characterized by its δ1-value.
4.4 Values of parameters and exogenous variables
Table 4.1 presents an overview of the parameters and exogenous variables of the life-cycle
model, and their values in the base scenario.
4.4.1 Utility parameters
As documented in Frederick et al. (2002), there is considerable disagreement among dozens of
studies that all purport to be measuring time preference. The discount rates in these studies range
from 0 to almost inﬁnity. The extreme high rates are usually associated with short periods of
time, less than one year. The average discount factor pertaining to periods of one year and higher
lies around 0.8. This would suggest a rate of time preference, ρ, of 0.25. However, this
predominance of high discount rates, and the lack of agreement between the studies likely
reﬂects the fact that the various procedures used to measure time preference consistently fail to
isolate time preference, and instead reﬂect a blend of both pure time preference and other
theoretically distinct considerations.36 Nearly all of these work to bias imputed discount rates
upward. Following the life-cycle literature, we choose a value of ρ = 0.03, close to the value of
the interest rate.
Concerning the existing literature on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), on the one
hand, empirical studies using aggregate consumption data typically ﬁnd that the EIS is close to
zero (Hall, 1988). On the other hand, calibrated macroeconomic models designed to match
34 These n points are chosen such that they divide the range in n+1 equal-sized subranges. For example, if n = 1, we
choose the midpoint of the range.
35 For this paper, the model contains 49 types.
36 These considerations include (a) intertemporal arbitrage; (b) concave utility; (c) uncertainty that the future reward or
penalty will actually obtain; (d) inﬂation; (e) expectations of changing utility; and (f) considerations of habit formation,
anticipatory utility, and visceral inﬂuences.
35growth and business cycle facts typically require that the EIS be close to one (Weil, 1989; Lucas,
1990, among others). In a recent paper, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) argues that accounting for
limited asset market participation is important for estimating the EIS. She ﬁnds estimates of the
EIS of around 0.3−0.4 for stockholders and around 0.8−1.0 for bondholders (the estimates are
larger for households with larger asset holdings within these two groups). Similarly, Guvenen
(2002) studies a dynamic macroeconomic model which incorporates limited asset market
participation together with an EIS that increases with wealth to reconcile the conﬂicting
evidence. He ﬁnds that the properties of aggregate variables directly linked to wealth, such as
investment and output (growth), are almost entirely determined by the (high-elasticity)
assetholders. (At the same time, since consumption is much more evenly distributed across
households than is wealth, estimation using aggregate consumption uncovers the low EIS of the
majority of households, i.e., the non-assetholders.) Mulligan (2002) argues that "the" interest
rate in aggregate theory should be measured as the expected return to a representative piece of
capital. Using this measure of the interest rate he estimates the aggregate EIS and obtains
estimates of 1 and above, roughly consistent with log utility speciﬁcations. In conclusion, these
studies indicate that the EIS roughly lies between 0 and 1. We take γ = 0.5.
There is little direct empirical evidence concerning the value of σ, the intratemporal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. Ghez and Becker (1975) found an aggregate
value of σ = 0.83. Lise and Seitz (2007) estimate this elasticity at 1.58 for men and 1.64 for
women. On the contrary, much evidence is available on the labour supply elasticities with
respect to the contemporaneous wage of both men and women. So, many studies use σ to attain
a target labour supply elasticity. However, the translation of these elasticities into estimates of σ
depends on the degree to which the underlying wage changes are permanent or temporary and
whether they are anticipated or not. As Auerbach et al. (1983) have shown, a wide range of
values of σ is consistent with estimated wage elasticities. For instance Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) choose a base case value of σ equal to 0.8, while Bovenberg and Knaap (2005) use an
elasticity of substitution of 0.56. To obtain a positive labour supply elasticity (with respect to a
permanent change in the wage rate) in our model, σ must exceed 1 (i.e., substitution effect
dominates income effect). More precisely: in order to achieve an elasticity of about 0.15, we
impose σ at 1.5. This is consistent with Lise and Seitz (2007).
The utility weights on consumption and leisure, µc and µv, are unobserved parameters. The
values of these parameters are chosen to match the shares of consumption and leisure in full
income.
Regarding the parameters (ω, α, φ) for the bequest motive empirical data hardly exist. In this
case the imposed values are mainly based on the shape of the resulting life-cycle proﬁles of
36wealth. To correspond with the level of the empirical wealth proﬁle, each individual receives
annually a bequest of 2,000 euro.
4.4.2 Time constraint parameters
The time available in each period, lmax, is set at 2,250 hours per year (this is equal to 45 weeks
of work, 50 hours per week. The minimum level of hours worked, lmin, is imposed at 540 hours
per year (i.e., 45 weeks of 12 hours per week).37 We assume that dt, measuring the variable
labour costs, starts to rise at age 50. This is motivated by studies that estimate the productivity
proﬁles for individual workers using employer-employee matched data sets. Most studies ﬁnd
that workers in their 30s and 40s have the highest productivity levels, while workers above age
50 have lower productivity levels than their younger colleagues (in spite of their higher wage
level).38 Variable labour costs before age 50 are set to 0.
4.4.3 Tax- and pension system parameters
In the calibration we aim to describe the behaviour of an average person in the Netherlands. This
average person is supposed to earn the average income of around 33,000 euro’s. His marginal
tax rate is approximately 25%, including the Social Security premium paid for national
insurances. We set this Social Security premium, τaow, at 10%, and the tax rate on income, τy, at
15%. The Social Security Premium for employees’ insurances (τs) is imposed at 12%.39
The tax rate on the stock of wealth, τa, is set at 1.2%. We ignore the tax rate on consumption,
as the price of the consumption good is chosen as the numeraire. The level of the pension
premium charged on income above a franchise of e11,000, τp, is determined at 5.1% in order to
obtain an almost balanced budget of pension funds. The pension accrual rate, β, is ﬁxed at
1.25%.40 This implies that at age 65, after 40 years of work, the gross replacement rate is equal
to 50% of average income.41 The (gross) Social Security beneﬁt is set at e11,000 per year,
which amounts to approximately e925 per month.42
37 For technical reasons, we divide the number of hours by 1000, i.e., lmax = 2.25 and lmin = 0.54.
38 See e.g. Skirbekk (2003).
39 From an institutional point of view these rates seem rather small. However, besides the pension premium, we ignore
the institutional franchises in our model. Furthermore, we ignore the institutional distinction between premiums paid by
employers and paid by employees. We assume that individuals receive their labour costs and pay all taxes and Social
Security premiums.
40 The value of 1.25% is slightly below the institutional rate, but reﬂects the gap in pension rights caused by the
non-transferability of these rights.
41 Taken into account Social Security premiums employees insurances, the net replacement rate is approximately 70%.
42 This is the level of gross Social Security beneﬁts (ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts) of singles in 2005. In the model this
coincides with δ = 11.
374.4.4 Exogenous variables
We choose the price of the consumption good, pt, to be the numeraire. The nominal interest rate
is imposed to have a value of 0.04. The applied mortality rates are based on data of the CBS.
Finally, starting from e17,250 (per 1000 hours) at age 25 up to the age 50, the nominal
wage rate (of the ﬁrst, main job) increase by 0.925% each year.43 After age 50, the wage rate is
constant. With 1,600 hours of work per year this amounts to a gross income of e33,600 per
year.
The wage rate associated with the second job is 45% lower. That is, once the agent decides to
take up the second job, his wage rate falls with 45%. After that, the wage rate continues to fall,
reﬂecting the decline in productivity at older ages. We have speciﬁed a linear decline in
second-job wages, falling to 10% of the wage rate of the ﬁrst job in 15 years. As hardly any
empirical data about post-retirement wage rates are available, the parameters of this part of the
wage proﬁle are used to obtain a maximum retirement age of 75 years.
4.5 Aggregation
To aggregate the individual results, such as consumption, labour supply and the like, we need to
have the composition of the population for each type of person. To construct these numbers we
use the following data sources. From the EBB 2004 44 we have the number of employed and the
total population, both according to age. Age runs from 25 until 74. In addition, we construct
estimates of percentages of the number of employed, for each age between 55 and 75, that retire
in 2004. Combined with the number of employed from the EBB 2004, these percentages
translate into the number of persons that retire at each age between 55 and 75. The number of
persons that retire at 55, for example, equals the number of persons of type 1 (the ones that retire
at 55) of 55 years of age. Likewise, the number of persons that retire at 56 equals the number of
persons of type 2 (the ones that retire at 56) of 56 years of age. And so on, until age 75. To
extrapolate these numbers to the other ages within each type, we assume that each type consists
of a ﬁxed fraction of the population.
43 This average annual growth of the wage rate is based on Alessie et al. (1997), ﬁgure 5(a), page 19. Starting at an
amount of (approximately) 30,000 guilders at age 20 and achieving annual earings about 40,000 guilders at age 50 and
assuming no differences between the number of hours worked, the average annual growth of the wage rate is
approximately 0.925%.
44 EBB is the "enquête beroepsbevolking", a random sample survey.
38Table 4.1 Parameters and exogenous variables
Symbol Deﬁnition Value Comment
Parameters
ρ Rate of time preference 0.03
γ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.50
σ Elasticity of intratemporal substitution 1.50
µc Utility weight on consumption 0.60
µv Utility weight on leisure 0.40
ω (Relative) weight of bequest motive 9.00
α Intertemporal substitution of bequest motive 0.35
φ Bequests luxury goods or necessary goods 0.10
lmin Minimum level of hours worked 0.54
lmax Time available in each period 2.25 representing 2250 hours
δ0 Variable labour costs, constant 0
Th Age after which labour costs starts to rise 50
τa Tax rate on stock of wealth 0.012
τy Tax rate on wage income 0.15 ﬂat rate on income
τc Tax rate on consumption 0
τs Social Security premium (employees’ insurance) 0.12
τp Pension premium 0.051
β Pension accrual rate 0.0125
tp Pension pivot age 65
f Pension franchise 11
τaow Social Security premium (national insurance) 0.10 for t < 65
δ Social Security beneﬁt 11 around 30% of gross income
Exogenous variables
rt Nominal interest rate 0.04
pt Price of the consumption good 1 numeraire
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Introduction
For a given set of parameters and exogenous variables (see Table 4.1), we can depict the
different individuals’ life-cycle behaviour. In the next section we will discuss the base
simulation and the key mechanisms behind these results. Thereafter, to conclude the description
of the calibration in this section, we will brieﬂy focus on the resulting labour supply elasticities,
age proﬁles of income, wealth and consumption and the retirement pattern.
394.6.2 Base scenario
For the assumed set of parameters and exogenous variables, Figure 4.2, for example, shows
labour supply trajectories over the life cycle concerning three different δ1-values.45
The solid line represents the labour supply of an individual with the smallest variable costs,
i.e. the δ1-value that results in a retirement age of 75. Until age 50 labour supply gradually
increases as the effective wage rate goes up due to the increasing value of (deﬁned beneﬁt)
pensions and the assumed exogenous wage growth.46 In principle the increasing mortality rate
raises the preference for consumption and leisure in earlier periods, implying a rising labour
supply over the life cycle too. However, the increase in the mortality rate does also raise the
importance of the bequest motive, which works in the opposite direction: a higher probability to
die raises the value of savings. In addition, mortality rates are quite small up to 50 years (less
than 0.5% per annum). Hence, this effect on the intertemporal allocation is neglible. After age
50, the increase in the effective wage rate is gradually reversed as the variable labour costs start
to rise. At age 65, the age of mandatory retirement, the individual quits her current (main) job,
and starts to receive pension income. As her health is still quite good, she decides to take the
opportunity to work part time in a second job. At age 65 she experiences a decrease in the net
effective real wage rate, and accompanying fall in labour supply. Although Social Security
premiums are reduced at age 65, the smaller wage in the second job dominates, resulting in the
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highest variable costs
45 Note that in this ﬁgure, and in the subsequent ﬁgures, age runs from 40 to 80 years.
46 See section 3.4 for an explanation why the effective wage rate increases as a result of the pension system.
40decrease in the net effective wage rate. Subsequently each year, as her costs of working continue
to rise, she supplies less labour. Until age 75, she decides to fully retire.
The dotted line represents the labour supply of an individual with the highest variable costs,
which result in retirement at age 55. After age 50, the positive δ1-value raises the variable labour
costs, reduces the effective wage rate and leads to a decline in labour supply. The high costs of
labour induce this person to reduce his hours of labour from full time to zero within ﬁve years.
The kink at age 54 reﬂects the minimum amount of hours that a person is required to work in his
main job, if not retired. At age 54 this restriction is binding, implying that working one year at
the minimum amount, and then retiring at 55, is preferred over quitting the labour force at 54.
For these individuals it does not pay to take a second job, after retiring from the ﬁrst job.
The dashed line, ﬁnally, represents the labour supply of an individual with middle-sized
variable costs. In this particular case these costs result in a continuous decrease of hours worked
from age 50, leading to a retirement from the main job at age 65. Thereafter, he works three
more years in a small second job before leaving the labour force completely.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the consumption and private ﬁnancial wealth trajectories belonging to
the same type of individuals. The dotted lines, for example, describe consumption and wealth
over the life cycle when variable costs are at their highest level. Wealth is accumulated for two
reasons: (i) to smooth consumption in response to a future decrease in hours of work and/or in
sufﬁcient and (ii) to leave a bequest. The fact that these persons are restricted in their choice






























middle sized variable costs
highest variable costs




























middle sized variable costs
highest variable costs
amount of hours or not work at all – produces the pronounced kink in consumption at age 54.
Basically, the higher than optimal level of hours worked is compensated by a higher level of
consumption at that age.47
In the period before 50, the age at which health starts to decline, mortality rates have hardly
any inﬂuence. As a result, the time-path of consumption in that period is mainly inﬂuenced by 1)
the gap between the real net interest rate (r −τa) and the rate of time preference (ρ) and 2) the
relative price of consumption (inverse of D). The gap between the real net interest rate and the
rate of time preference leads to a slightly falling consumption proﬁle as the net real interest rate
is below the rate of time preference. Simultaneously the increase in the effective wage rate due
to the impact of DB pensions and the assumed wage proﬁle, imply an increasing consumption
level until age 50 (intratemporal substitution effect).
After full retirement, mortality rates start to be numerically relevant, making the time-path of
consumption also a function of wealth through the bequest motive. As the relative price of
consumption is ﬁxed, the slope of the consumption proﬁle in this period is determined by the
difference between the real net interest rate and the rate of time preference and the (slope of the)
wealth trajectory. A declining level of wealth, for example, implies that the marginal utility of
leaving a bequest is increasing. This requires that the marginal utility of consumption (remember
that leisure is ﬁxed) is increasing, implying declining levels of consumption. This is what
happens in the consumption and wealth proﬁles of the individual with the highest variable costs:
47 In terms of the model, the shadow price of leisure rises (inducing the higher level of hours worked), making
consumption relatively cheaper (intratemporal substitution).
42declining levels of wealth after full retirement are associated with declining levels of
consumption. In addition, the rate of time preference is higher than the interest rate, reinforcing
the decrease in consumption.
The solid lines, in turn, describe consumption and wealth over the life cycle of an individual
with the smallest variable costs. Until age 65, she slowly builds up wealth, mainly for bequest
purposes. A small part of her wealth is used for smoothing purposes. After age 65, net income,
consisting of both pension beneﬁts and income from work, increases. At the same time the need
for consumption reduces as a result of the reduction in labour supply and the accompanying
increase in leisure, as consumption and leisure are substitutes. Furthermore, the increased
mortality rates raise the interest of the bequest motive affecting the allocation of annual funds
among consumption and savings. Therefore, after 65 – the age at which the ample pension
beneﬁts become available – savings are high, as reﬂected by the fastly increasing wealth levels.
In this stage wealth is largely accumulated for bequest motives. After full retirement at age 75
consumption marginally declines – for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason concerns the difference
between the real interest rate and the rate of time preference (the latter is higher). The second
reason concerns the resulting (marginal) decline in wealth, which, as described above, implies a
decline in consumption.
The consumption and wealth proﬁles of an individual with middle-sized labour costs are
given by the dashed lines. Due to the rise in labour costs and the accompanying decline in labour
supply and income, consumption starts to decline around the age of 50 years. This decline of
consumption is less pronounced than the decline in income as the individual has accumulated
some wealth in anticipation. Basically, the individual saves to ﬁnance part-time work in his late
50s and early 60s. Consumption features a kink at age 65 due to the sudden increase in leisure at
that time. Until age 65 wealth follows the same pattern as for the individual with the smallest
variable costs. Due to the higher labour costs and accompanying steeper decline in hours
worked, this individual accumulates higher levels of wealth in this period. A sizable fraction of
this wealth is used to set off the declining levels of income. Then, from the moment of the ﬁrst
pension receipt on, this individual starts to accumulate wealth holdings to provide for his needs
to leave a bequest. This implies that both wealth holdings and consumption, the latter after full
retirement, increase over time.
The combination of relatively high incomes later in life with a bequest motive implies that in
times of relatively low incomes the individual is still compelled – by her own motive – to save.
This leads to lower levels of consumption at earlier phases in the life cycle and higher levels later
on. That is, the consumption proﬁle rotates anticlockwise. This is shown in ﬁgure 4.3, in which
the consumption trajectories of the individuals with highest and middle-sized variable costs – the
ones with relatively high incomes later in life – are steeper than the consumption trajectory of
the individuals with the smallest costs.
434.6.3 Resulting key ﬁgures and proﬁles
Aggregate effects
The macroeconomic implications of this base scenario are depicted in ﬁgures 4.5 to 4.8. The
aggregation of the individual results is based on the composition of the population in 2004, as
described in section 4.5.48 Individuals start to withdraw from the labour market at age 55,
implying that the participation rate is 100% until age 55, and then starts to fall, ﬁrst rapidly, then
more slowly, until at age 75 everybody is retired. The same pattern is visible in the graph
displaying total labour supply, which also reﬂects the decline in hours worked after age 50 and
the decline in population starting in the late 50s. Total private ﬁnancial wealth accumulates
during the ﬁrst periods of the life cycle and reaches the top around the early to late ﬁfties, and is
quickly decumulated thereafter. This reﬂects both the decline in population and the fact that
many agents at these ages decumulate assets to ﬁnance their declining levels of hours worked.
The amounts of private ﬁnancial wealth after 65 are largely hold to leave bequests.
























































































48 This explains the irregular behaviour of the macroeconomic variables, as age groups have different sizes.
44Elasticities
Looking at the labour supply elasticities the average elasticity is about .13 (see Figure 4.9).
Among the distinghuished groups (different d1-values) only small differences exist. The
age-proﬁle of the elasticity is quite ﬂat. Only at ages close to the retirement age sharp increases
occur. Euwals et al. (2006) estimate that (on average) individuals will postpone their retirement
age by 5 months if pension wealth falls by 100,000 euro’s. In order to compare the simulation
properties of our model with this empirical result, we investigated the labour supply effect of a
fall in lifetime income of 30,000 euros. In contrast to Euwals et al. (2006) our model results do
not show an increase in the retirement age, but an increase in annual labour supply during the
entire life cycle (hours worked). As our model has an annual frequency, the step size of the
retirement age is equal to full years. So, in the case of small shocks an adjustment of labour
supply at the intensive margin might be more appropriate. Converting this rise of labour supply
into full-time equivalents over the life cycle, which encompasses the effects of a change in the
extensive margin as well as a change in the intensive margin, yields an increase of labour supply
about 0.12 (fte) years. Or in other words: an increase of approximately 1.4 months. Taken into
account the different size of the impulse, this outcome is in line with Euwals et al. (2006).
Age proﬁles
Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 show the (average) age proﬁles of labour income, consumption and
ﬁnancial wealth. In agreement with the earlier described literature the model generates a
hump-shaped age proﬁle of labour income. Consumption shows a small hump-shape as all
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45agents are single person households. Finally, the model generates a hump-shaped (ﬁnancial)
wealth proﬁle. However, as already mentioned in the literature, the age proﬁles of wealth are
quite heterogeneous. As shown by ﬁgure 4.13 the age proﬁle of wealth is hump-shaped for some
groups (groups 26 and 36), while for other groups (6 and 16) the age proﬁle shows saving at
older ages.
4.7 Concluding remarks
The preceding sections describe the parameters and exogenous variables of the model and the
key features of the resulting base scenario. The values of the parameters and exogenous
variables in the base scenario are determined on the basis of studies in the (international)
literature and (roughly) on average characteristics of the Dutch economy. In addition, to be able
to explain the variety in retirement ages, the agents in the model are distinguished with respect to
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46their (variable) costs of labour supply. Agents with high costs experience fast reductions in their
effective wage rates, leading to lower retirement ages. The model is calibrated to span retirement
ages from 55 to 75. This implies the presence of 21 groups, where each group has its own
retirement age. The sizes of these groups are based on Dutch retirement data in 2004. To limit
the number of identical agents, these groups are divided into subgroups that have the same
retirement age (in the base scenario), but have different labour costs. The resulting key features,
such as elasticities and age-proﬁles of consumption and private ﬁnancial wealth correspond to
the results found in the economic literature.
47485 Simulations
5.1 Introduction
Six policy simulations are conducted. The ﬁrst simulation consists of elimination of the
exemption of Social Security premiums for national insurances after achieving age 65. In the
second simulation we shift the age of access to the ﬁrst-tier pensions from 65 to 67 years. Third,
we consider the introduction of an early retirement scheme. The fourth simulation concerns an
alternative pension scheme characterized by a ﬁxed commencing date and no labour supply
constraint. Next (ﬁfth simulation), we focus on the effects of a more ﬂexible pension scheme.
The sixth simulation discusses the introduction of a delayed retirement credit associated with a
prolonged participation in the labour market. Finally, we look at the budgetary effects. In
particular of government and pension funds. For several reasons the simulations so far are open
budget exercises. In order to assess the closed budget effects, we conduct two additional
simulations. First a reduction in the tax rate on income. Next, the effects of a cut in the pension
premium are analysed. Finally, an adequate approximation of the closed budget effects can be
obtained by an suitable combination of the discussed partial simulations. Each of these
simulations is described in relation to the base projection. The contents of this projection is
described in the section 4.6.2. Sections 5.2 to 5.8 describe the policy simulations.
5.2 Eliminating Social Security premium exemption of the elderly
Both ageing of the population and increases in life expectancy will raise government
expenditures for Social Security beneﬁts. One policy measure that may keep these expenditures
affordable is to lower (or eliminate) the Social Security premium exemption of the elderly. In the
base scenario, reﬂecting the current situation in the Netherlands, individuals are exempted from
Social Security premiums once they reach the age of 65 years. The current simulation fully
eliminates this exemption, effectively making the Social Security premium constant over the life
cycle.49
In the remaining part of this section we will ﬁrst focus on the incentives of this policy
change, then explain the aggregate responses of all individuals, and ﬁnally examine the
robustness of the results.
49 For the sake of simplicity we do not adjust the gross ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts and the tax system. Furthermore, we
abstract from transitional measures and periods. In this respect the contents of this simulation deviates from Dutch
institutions and current policy proposals.
49Incentives
The introduction of positive Social Security premiums from age 65 onwards reduces net income,
from work and/or from state pension and/or from second-tier pension beneﬁts.
The reduction in the net state pension causes a wealth effect, as this pension is independent
from an individual’s labour supply. As a result the lower net state pension induces agents to raise
their work effort, both at the intensive margin (the hours decision) as well as the extensive
margin (the retirement decision).
Whereas changes in non-labour income only yield a wealth effect, changes in labour income
also yield intratemporal substitution effects. In the current setting, because σ > 1, the
(intratemporal) substitution effect dominates the income effect. This implies that a lower
effective wage rate induces individuals to reduce labour supply, both at the intensive as well as
the extensive margin. The current policy measure changes labour income in two ways, (i) a
reduction in second-tier pension income, and (ii) a reduction in the net effective wage rate after
age 65.
The reduction in second-tier pension income, which is actually deferred wage income, means
a reduction in the reward to labour supply (concerning the ﬁrst job), yielding a lower net
effective wage rate.50 This lower net effective wage rate applies to the period in which the agents
accumulate second-tier pensions.
In addition, as a direct consequence of the Social Security premium exemption, the net
effective wage rate also falls after (and including) age 65. The intratemporal substitution effect
being the stronger force, labour supply also falls at these ages. Of course, these incentives only
apply to those individuals who actually receive wage income in that period.
Besides the aforementioned wealth effect of the cut in net state pension beneﬁts and income
and intratemporal substitution effect of changes in the effective wage rate, there are two
intertemporal substitution effects caused by the altered proﬁle of the effective wage rate. The ﬁrst
effect results from the fact that the fall in the net effective wage rate after 65 is larger than the fall
occurring before 65. This brings about an intertemporal reallocation, shifting labour supply from
the period after 65 – again displayed both in hours worked and retirement age – to the period
before 65. Again, this effect is only relevant for the agents that do actually work beyond age 64
in the base scenario. The second intertemporal substitution effect induces a reallocation of
labour within the working period up to the age of (second tier) pension receipt. In contrast to an
actuarial fair pension scheme and ignoring the impact of the variable labour costs, the assumed
deﬁned beneﬁt pension scheme with a common pension premium results in a rising net effective
50 In the model, this effect is reﬂected in a change in ζt, the shadow value associated with the accumulation of second-tier
pensions. The presence of the exemption in the base scenario favours pension savings relative to private savings. This
induces agents to save more through pension funds. As these savings are mandatory and consist of a ﬁxed fraction of
income from work, this provides an incentive to work more. Elimination of this exemption, then, will imply a fall in labour
supply. As shown in equation (3.39), a fall in ζt, reﬂecting a worsening of the relative utility of pension savings compared
to private savings, causes the net effective wage rate to fall.
50wage rate up to the age of pension receipt. This pension system, therefore, shifts labour supply
from younger to older ages. Elimination of the Social Security premium exemption reduces
these advantages and, thus, induces a reallocation of labour supply in favour of younger ages.
Aggregate effects
In reaction to the elimination of the Social Security premium exemption, individuals supply less
labour over their lifetime – see table 5.1. This holds for nearly all types of individuals. As shown
by ﬁgure 5.1, which describes the change in (million) hours between simulation and base
scenario, and ﬁgure 5.2, the reduction in labour supply and the participation rate is widespread
across the different ages. Furthermore, these ﬁgures show a strong correlation between changes
in labour supply and changes in participation rate. In other words: changes in labour supply at
the extensive margin. As might be expected, the largest changes in the participation rate and
labour supply occur at age cohorts above 65 years. The fall in labour supply is largely caused by
an earlier withdrawal from the labour market as inﬂuenced by the minimum hours constraint. In
the baseline scenario the labour supply (hours worked) of many types is, just before retirement
from their main job, equal to the minimum hours level. Without this minimum hours constraint
Table 5.1 Eliminating Social Security premium exemption of the elderly
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force − 0.2
Labour supply (%) − 0.2
Consumption (%) − 1.1
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) − 0.1
Government budget (bln, abs dif) 5.6
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) − 0.1
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.1
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.3
Participation rate (%-point) − 0.4
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) − 2.2
Participation rate (%-point) − 1.2
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) − 16.6
Participation rate (%-point) − 2.1
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) − 31.6
Participation rate (%-point) − 1.1
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(i.e., in the interior solution) agents of these groups would like to work less than this level.
However, facing the choice between retirement (from main job) and working at the minimum
level, these individuals prefer the minimum level in the baseline scenario. As elimination of the
exemption of Social Security premiums within an actuarial unfair pension scheme reduces the
effective wage rate and shifts the intertemporal allocation towards labour supply at younger ages,
these agents shift from hours worked at the minimum level towards either full time retirement or
a small part-time second job. Due to the assumed decline in wages in these second jobs, an
earlier transition from main to second job is accompanied by lower wages, which often leads to
an earlier withdrawal from the labour force.
The decreases in labour supply and participation beyond age 65 are additionally due to the
direct impact of the higher premium on the wages in that period. The individuals that work in
this period face lower wages in their second job and decrease both hours worked and
participation in response.51
51 The peaks in ﬁgures 5.1 and 5.2 are caused by the (discrete) shifts in retirement age of some of the discerned groups.
More groups, for instance as the result of a monthly model, will show a more ﬂuent pattern.
52The associated decline in lifetime consumption is more concentrated in the after-65 period, see
ﬁgure 5.3, which describes the change in (billion) euro’s of (real) consumption between
simulation and base scenario. There are two reasons for this intertemporal reallocation of
consumption. First, consumption is lower at older ages because hours worked are also lower at
these ages (consumption and leisure are substitutes). The second reason concerns the bequest
motive. The reduction of total income over the life cycle reduces both consumption and the level
of the bequest. 52 The lower bequest allows the individuals to consume more in their earlier
phases of life and, consequently, less in later phases.
The changes in consumption around age 60 occur as agents face the minimum labour
constraint. In general facing this constraint implies an increase in consumption, as consumption
and leisure are substitutes. Individuals who were restricted in the base simulation and retire
earlier in response to the higher Social Security premiums, will therefore reduce consumption.
Looking at the budgetary effects (table 5.1), the additional tax receipts result in an improved
government budget of about 5.6 bln euros.53 Regarding the total cash ﬂow of pension funds the
fall in labour supply reduces both the premium base and the promised pension beneﬁts. The net
effect in this simulation of these two opposite forces is almost nil.
Reallocations of individuals with smallest variable costs in response to eliminating Social Security premium
exemption
Individuals with the smallest variable costs, slightly increase hours worked in their main job. This increase in hours worked
is the result of some opposing incentives, consisting of wealth, income and (intra- and intertemporal) substitution effects.
Hours worked in their second job are adjusted downwards, as a result of the lower wages, in turn caused by the increased
Social Security premiums. The resulting higher levels of leisure are accompanied by lower levels of consumption. These
lower levels of consumption are reinforced by the lowered need for bequests and the reduction in income after 65. Both
factors tend to reduce consumption later in life, while the lower bequests also tend to raise consumption early in life. As
a consequence, the reduction of consumption following the reduction in lifetime income is concentrated in the last phases
of the life cycle. As a result of the more evenly distributed income over time, wealth accumulation is likewise more evenly
distributed, i.e. more savings in the working period (main job) and less savings in the retirement period (resulting in lower
levels of wealth later in life).
52 The fall in consumption raises the marginal utility of consumption which calls for an increase in the marginal utility of the
bequest too. Or in other words: a reduced level of the bequest.
53 This amount exceeds the amount mentioned in CPB (2008) (page 18). However, in our simulation we neglect the
simultaneous increase in gross state pensions (additional government expenses) and adjustments in the tax system (less
government receipts). Please note. The mentioned budgetary effect should not be confused with the concept of ﬁscal
sustainability as the partial life-cycle model is not suitable to assess these effects.
53Reallocations of individuals with highest variable costs in response to eliminating Social Security premium
exemption
The impact of eliminating the premium exemption on the individuals with the highest variable costs is different, because
these individuals are retired long before age 65, and because they have relatively lower incomes after retirement. Con-
sequently, their labour supply trajectory hardly changes at all (the income and substitution effects roughly cancel). To
counterbalance the loss of pension income, these agents increase their wealth holdings and reduce their consumption
level evenly over their whole life cycle.
5.3 Raising statutory retirement age
Nowadays, and also assumed in the base projection, the 65th anniversary implies entry to the
ﬁrst-tier pension scheme and, if still at work at that age, a compulsory dismissal from the current
job.54 Furthermore, after age 65 individuals are exempted from Social Security premiums. In this
simulation we shift the statutory retirement age, the exemption of Social Security premiums and
the compulsory dismissal to age 67. The pivot age of the second-tier pension scheme remains
unaltered.55 Again, we will look at the changes in labour supply, consumption and savings.
Incentives
The policy package of this simulation contains several, sometimes opposite, incentives to labour
supply. First, the delay of access to ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts reduces lifetime income and leads
to an incentive to increase lifetime labour supply, by a rise in annual labour supply (i.d. more
hours per year) and/or deferred retirement (more years).
Second, compared to the base scenario the shift in the exemption of Social Security
premiums reduces the net effective wage during the ages 65 and 66. This will reduce the
opportunity costs of leisure and will induce an intratemporal substitution between consumption
and leisure and an intertemporal substitution between leisure in different periods. Furthermore, it
reduces net pension beneﬁts of already retired individuals.
Third, the shift in the age of compulsory dismissal implies better job opportunities for the
still employed individuals at the age of 65 years. Instead of being ﬁred and perhaps looking for a
less well paid job, they are able to keep their – better paid – current job. This implies higher
opportunity costs of leisure and therefore an increase in labour supply at the ages of 65 and 66.
In contrast to the inﬂuence of increased Social Security premiums, the shift in the age of the
54 In the Netherlands almost all collective labour agreements are (temporarily) elevated at a particular age, often 65.
Although dismissal at that particular age is not obliged, in practice the majority of employers lays off its employees at this
age. Therefore, from the perspective of employees, this age acts as an age of compulsory dismissal.
55 This simulation differs from CPB (2008). For instance the shift in the retirement age is only two years. Furthermore,
CPB (2008) also assumes adjustments in second-tier pension schemes, while we ignore these adjustments. Next, the
labour supply effects in CPB (2008) are based on assumed changes in participation rates (including ‘framing effects’),
while the labour supply effects of the life-cycle model are fully based on optimal reallocations of lifetime consumption and
labour supply in response to the altered policy and so the model ignores some insights of behavioural economics.
54compulsory age of retirement increases the real net wage in the range between old and new age
of statutory retirement and will induce an (opposite) intratemporal substitution between
consumption and leisure and an (opposite) intertemporal reallocation of lifetime leisure.
Aggregate effects
Concerning the macroeconomic effects of this policy change a small increase in labour supply
(hours) about 0.3% and a small fall in consumpion about 0.5% occurs. The average age of
quitting the labour force shifts about 0.1 year56, while the participation rate only signiﬁcantly
changes after age 65.57
Table 5.2 Economic effects of raising statutory retirement age
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force 0.1
Labour supply (%) 0.3
Consumption (%) − 0.5
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) 0.1
Government budget (bln, abs dif) 6.4
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) − 1.3
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) 0.1
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) 0.0
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) 46.5
Participation rate (%-point) 1.3
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) 60.1
Participation rate (%-point) 1.3
56 This result is slightly lower than empirical studies like Gustman and Steinmeier (1985), Gustman and Steinmeier (2006)
and Fields and Mitchell (1984). These authors ﬁnd approximately a delay of two months if the statutory retirement age is
shifted from 65 to 67 year. Furthermore, our results are smaller than the results of Mastrobuoni (2006) and of the DNB
household survey (De Nederlandsche Bank (2008)). Mastrobuoni (2006) estimates the effect on the retirement age of a
shift in the statutory retirement age at 50%. The responses in the DNB household survey indicate an effect of 40%.
57 As in the base scenario the number of people working above the age of 75 years is nil, a shift towards these ages leads
to a strong increase in the participation rate at these ages. However, the amount of people involved is quite small.
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Focusing on economic behaviour at the ages 41-80, the described policy changes result in a
moderate increase in labour supply until the early 60’s, and a simultaneous fall in consumption
(see ﬁgures 5.5 and 5.7 which describe the changes in million hours of work and in billion euro’s
of (real) consumption between simulation and base scenario).
Up to the old age of statutory retirement, age 65, the reallocation of consumption, leisure and
labour supply is determined by the wealth effect, intertemporal substitution effect and, possibly,
the bequest motive and restrictions on the ability to work. First, ignoring the bequest motive and
restrictions on the ability to work, the shift of the statutory retirement age reduces ﬁrst-tier
pensions and net second-tier pension beneﬁts of individuals already retired before age 65. These
changes reduce net lifetime income and lead to a fall in consumption, leisure and, consequently,
an increase in labour supply over the life cycle.
Because up to the age 54 full participation is assumed, the increase in labour supply in that
period is equal to the rise in hours worked. Thereafter, participation starts to increase. As a
consequence, the rise in total labour supply after age 54 might be caused by an increase in the
participation rate (due to delayed retirement) and/or an increase in hours worked. Figure 5.6
56(depicting differences between simulation and base scenario) shows however that until age 67
participation is unaffected, implying that all changes in labour supply before age 67 are due to
changes in hours worked. Only from age 67 the increase in the participation rate explains a
signiﬁcant part of the increase in labour supply.
In addition to reallocation due to the wealth effect, time allocation in the period up to the old age
of statutory retirement is affected by the intertemporal substitution effect of leisure.58 The shift
of the statutory retirement age changes the opportunity costs of leisure during the time period
between old and new age of retirement in two ways. First, the shift of the exemption of Social
Security premiums reduces net wages. Second, but only relevant to individuals affected by the
compulsory dismissal, the delay of compulsory dismissal offers the opportunity to stay at the
current, better paid, job. In this simulation the net effect of both changes is an increase in net
wages in that period.59 This will lead to intertemporal substitution: for those individuals whose
wage increases, time spent on leisure increases in advance of the old age of statutory retirement
and decreases in the period between old and new period of retirement.
Summarizing, in advance of the old age of statutory retirement (age 65) the wealth effect
reduces consumption and leisure, while the (intertemporal) substitution effect increases leisure.
In the period between old and new age of retirement, reallocations are again induced by the
aforementioned wealth and intertemporal substitution effects, but also by an intratemporal
substitution effect. As described above and ignoring the impact of a bequest motive, the income
effect results in less consumption and leisure in this period.60
On the one hand, regarding individuals who already exchanged their ﬁrst job for a less paid
but more ﬂexible new job (including the receipt of pension beneﬁts), the intertemporal
substitution effect will lead to a reduction in labour supply between the old and new age of
statutory retirement and an increase in labour supply in advance as net wages fall in this period.
However, as shown by ﬁgure 5.6, the reduction in labour supply is not accompanied by a
reduction in the participation rate at ages 65 and 66. On the other hand, regarding individuals
who experienced a compulsory dismissal in the base scenario, the shift in the age of compulsory
dismissal results in a higher net wage rate at 65 and 66, notwithstanding the increase in
premiums paid, as the ﬁrst job has a signiﬁcantly higher wage. These individuals will increase
their labour supply between the old and new age of retirement.
A similar divide applies to the intratemporal substitution effect. If net wages increase,
individuals choose to reduce time spent on leisure activities and increase consumption and
labour supply in this period. Individuals facing a reduction in net effective wage rate in this
58 This substitution effect is only relevant for individuals who are able to work after the old age of retirement.
59 Social Security premiums are raised by 10%-points, while nominal wages increase by 30%.
60 The latter applies if individuals are still able to work.
57Reallocations of individuals with highest variable costs in response to raising statutory retirement age
In the base scenario, the individuals with highest variable costs retire at age 55, and consequently are not affected by
changes in the wage rate at 65 and beyond. For them, the rise in the statutory retirement age means a reduction, i.e.
a two-year delay, in Social Security beneﬁts and a cut in net pension beneﬁts as a result of the shift in the premium
exemption. The former reduction produces a wealth effect: the loss of income prompts individuals to increase labour
supply and reduce consumption. As the loss of income occurs at ages 65 and 66, this leads to increases in wealth. The
latter reduction is actually a reduction in the effective wage rate, which produces both an income and a substitution effect.
Due to the dominance of the substitution effect this reduction causes the individual to lower his labour supply. Because the
reduction in net pension beneﬁts (10% over two years of beneﬁts) is much smaller than the reduction in Social Security
beneﬁts, the wealth effect dominates the results. For these individuals, the increase in labour supply is fully manifested in
increases in hours worked. The high variable costs actually precludes them from extending their working lifes.a
a Beyond a certain age, in this case 54, the high variable costs in combination with the minimum size of hours worked are incompatible
with the total available time.
Reallocations of individuals with smallest variable costs in response to raising statutory retirement age
The individuals with smallest variable costs continue working far beyond the old (and new) statutory retirement age. There-
fore, in addition to the effects impacting on the individuals with highest variable costs as described in the accompanying
textbox, these individuals are affected by the changes in the wage rate at 65 and beyond. The shift in the exemption of
Social Security premiums reduces the wage rate at ages 65 and 66. However, the shift in the compulsary dismissal allows
them to work two years longer in their main job. The higher wages that prevail in these main jobs, as compared with the
wages in second jobs, dominate the presence of the Social Security premiums, resulting in higher wages at 65 and 66. In
addition, the delay of retirement from their main job implies a simultaneous delay of human capital depreciation, causing
net wages (prevailing in their second job) to be higher than before. Thus, wages after (and including) 65 are higher, while
wages before 65 are (marginally) lower than in the baseline scenario. This induces the individuals to supply less labour
before 65 and more thereafter. The lower levels of leisure after 65 are accompanied, or compensated, by higher levels of
consumption, and vice versa before 65. The postponement of pension payments extends the ﬁrst period of consumption
smoothing, and delays the accumulation of assets for bequest purposes.
period, conversely, will increase leisure and reduce consumption and labour supply.
Summarizing, for some agents the wealth effect, the intratemporal substitution effect and the
intertemporal substitution effect all point to a fall in leisure and an increase in labour supply in
this period. This increase in labour supply reveals itself both in increases in the number of hours
worked per year and in delayed retirement. Other agents reduce labour supply in this period. As
witnessed by ﬁgure 5.5, the former type of individuals dominate the aggregate effects. This is
also apparent from aggregate consumption at ages 65 and 66, although the impact on total
consumption at these ages is still negative, due to the lower consumption levels of the majority
of individuals that are already retired at these ages. As we assume a gradual depreciation of
human capital after retirement from the ﬁrst job, reﬂected in diminishing wages, in the current
simulation this path of depreciation is, for those who choose to work longer in their main job,
postponed by one or two years. That is, after the new age of statutory retirement net wages (in
second jobs) are higher than before and cause an (intratemporal) substitution effect between
58consumption and leisure. As a result, labour supply increases (see ﬁgure 5.5), both in terms of
hours worked and in an increase in the participation rate (see ﬁgure 5.6). The accompanying
lower levels of leisure, in turn, imply an increase in consumption, which, in the aggregate,
translates to a smaller negative effect on consumption.
Finally, the shift in the age of pension receipt for some types of individuals in combination with
the bequest motive induces them to consume their higher lifetime pension beneﬁts in a shorter
period. The presence of the bequest motive limits their possibility, or more accurately, their
desire to lower their wealth levels earlier in life in order to raise consumption. On the contrary,
the higher level of lifetime income induces these individuals to raise their target level of bequest,
increasing the value of wealth. This pushes up consumption of the retirees.
As shown in table 5.2, the reduction in government transfers improves the government budget.
The total cash ﬂow of pension funds deteriorates. The increase in labour supply increases both
received premiums and paid beneﬁts. As the change in paid beneﬁts exceeds the change in
received premiums, the total cash ﬂow of pension funds falls.
5.4 Introduction of an early retirement scheme
In this simulation we introduce an actuarial unfair early retirement scheme (ERS). If an
individual voluntarily leaves the labour force at an age between 60 and 64 years, he receives a
(lump sum) ERS income transfer in advance of the receipt of pension beneﬁts at age 65.The size
of this transfer is 80% of the average labour income during the preceding 10 years.
The introduction of ERS leads to a double-peaked decision problem. This is true because, as the
use of this scheme is voluntarily, the optimal allocation and associated lifetime utility of the base
scenario remains an option. The second option, then, is to take part in the ERS. The second
option consists of a different optimal allocation of lifetime consumption and leisure as taking
part in the ERS changes the lifetime budget constraint and imposes a constraint on labour supply
after entering this scheme (that is, to be eligible for the ERS income transfer, you have to retire
fully within a speciﬁed time period and are not allowed to resume work any time in the future).
The ratio between the amount of the income transfer and the amount of missed labour income
and associated pension beneﬁts is the crucial factor in determining which of the two locally
optimal allocations is the global optimum.
Incentives
Focusing on the allocation associated with participation in the ERS, the lifetime allocation of
consumption and leisure is affected by (i) the change in the lifetime budget constraint and (ii) the
imposed labour supply constraint. The changed lifetime budget causes an income effect, while
59the imposed labour supply constraint causes an intertemporal and intratemporal substitution
effect.61
Aggregate effects
As the ERS is a subsidy to quit the labour market at a particular age or age-range, the intuitive
result is an extended participation and labour supply of individuals with retirement ages just
before the entrance date of the scheme, while individuals with retirement ages after this entrance
date will reduce their participation and labour supply. Furthermore, the link between the ERS
income transfer and average labour income in the preceding 10 years will stimulate labour
supply at ages 50 and 59 years. This intuitive result also follows from our model (see ﬁgure 5.10
in which the dashed line describes the results of the simulation), but as the net effect of different
behavioural responses of the distinguished groups. Some groups, in particular groups with larger
variable costs, prefer a prolonged period of labour force participation until 60 years. Other
groups, in particular groups with smaller variable costs, reduce their working period. Finally
Table 5.3 Economic effects of early retirement scheme
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force − 2.2
Labour supply (%) − 1.2
Consumption (%) 3.2
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) − 0.7
Government budget (bln, abs dif) − 22.6
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) − 8.8
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) 9.5
Participation rate (%-point) 2.2
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) − 100.0
Participation rate (%-point) − 31.6
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) − 100.0
Participation rate (%-point) − 11.8
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) − 100.0
Participation rate (%-point) − 3.4
61 As the associated shadow price (η) alters the effective wage rate.


























difference between simulation and base scenario






























































there are some groups, in particular groups with extremely large and extremely small variable
costs, who do not alter their consumption and leisure over the life cycle. In order to increase
their ERS income transfers, individuals of these groups raise their labour supply between 50 and
59 years. In the case of extremely large variable costs individuals retire before the age of 60
years due to the infeasibility of the size of the variable costs, imposed minimum amount of
working hours and maximum available time. This constraint prevents reallocations of lifetime
consumption and lifetime leisure in response to the introduction of an early retirement scheme.
In this simulation individuals with extremely small variable cost also enter the ERS. However, in
a simulation with an ERS income transfer of signiﬁcantly less than 80% of the average labour
income, these individuals could decide not to enter the ERS as lifetime utility of working until
age 75 do not exceed lifetime utility of using the ERS (where the latter leads to less lifetime
income and more leisure). In the textboxes we focus on the reallocations of the ﬁrst (larger
variable costs) and second category (smaller variable costs). Looking at the aggregate results, in
our simulation almost everyone enter the ERS and so the participation rate and labour supply
become nil after age 60 (see ﬁgures 5.9 and 5.10). In this simulation the average age of
61Reallocations of individuals with large variable costs in response to ERS
In the base scenario individuals with large variable costs retire before the entrance date of the ERS as the effective wage
rate becomes to small due to the variable costs. In this simulation these individuals face a positive effect on lifetime
income if they postpone their retirement for a few years. First, they receive the ERS income tranfer. Second, they receive
additional labour income during the years up to the entrance date of the ERS and associated higher (lifetime) pension
beneﬁts after age 65. This increase in lifetime income results in a higher consumption. Compared to the base scenario,
the increase in lifetime income also results in more leisure and less labour supply up to the age 50. Up to the retirement
age in the base scenario, the link between the ERS income transfer and average labour income in the period 50-59 years
results in an increase in the effective wage rate and so labour supply goes up as the substitution effect exceeds the
income effect. Next, the imposed minimum labour supply constraint implies an increase in the participation rate and a
higher effective wage rate in the period between the retirement age (in the base scenario) and entrance date of the ERS.
This increase in the effective wage rate also causes an intratemporal and an intertemporal substitution. The intratemporal
substitution effect leads to more consumption and less leisure. The intertemporal substitution effect results in more leisure
in advance of the retirement age (in the base scenario) as leisure just before the entrance date of the ERS becomes more
expensive. So, individuals with large variable costs increase consumption up to the entrance date of the scheme (income
effect and intratemporal substitution effect), while they reduce labour supply in advance of their (baseline) retirement age
(intertemporal substitution effect dominates income effect) and increase labour supply between this age and the entrance
date of the ERS. Up to the baseline retirement age, the increase in consumption and fall in labour supply reduces savings
and private ﬁnancial wealth. Compared to the baseline, during the period of prolonged labour market participation savings
increase due to received labour income which exceeds the increased consumption.
After the age 60 the reallocation is inﬂuenced by the increase in lifetime income as, in the base scenario, the effective
wage rate in this period is already small due to high variable costs. So, after age 60 (relative) prices are almost similar to
the base scenario and do not result in a (signiﬁcant) reallocation by a substitution effect. Furthermore, the replacement
of second-tier pension beneﬁts by the ERS income transfer reduces current income between 60 and 65 years of age.
Therefore, consumption falls between 60 and 65 years as current income falls and a full compensation by dissaving would
reduce the utility of bequests. After age 65 the increased pension beneﬁts offer the opportunity to raise simultaneously
consumption and bequests.
withdrawal from the labour market reduces with 2.2 years and total labour supply falls with
1.2% (see table 5.3). Induced by the income and the substitution effects consumption
simultaneously changes between the ages 50 - 65 years (see ﬁgure 5.11). Regarding
consumption opposite effects appears for different groups. Groups facing large variable costs
will increase their consumption due to an increased lifetime income. Groups facing small
variable costs reduce their consumption as lifetime income falls. The net effect of opposite
changes in consumption behaviour is an increase of about 3.2%. Finally, savings and private
ﬁnancial wealth fall as the ERS implies an income transfer after leaving the labour market which
reduces the necessity of private wealth in order to consume after retirement (see ﬁgure 5.12).
The ERS reduces the government budget. First, as the ERS income transfer is paid by the
government. Second, as the base of income taxes and Social Security premiums falls as the
decrease in labour income (due to less labour supply) is only partly offset by the received ERS
62income transfer. The cash ﬂow of pension funds also falls. In this case the fall in received
pension premiums exceeds the fall in paid pension beneﬁts as the accrual of pension rights just
before the pivot age of the pension scheme falls.
5.5 Fixed beneﬁt commencement date
This simulation analyses the effects on labour supply, consumption and wealth of a change in the
commencement date of the second-tier pension beneﬁt. In the base scenario the agents start to
draw pension beneﬁts after they have stopped working in their main job, i.e., the date of pension
receipt is linked to their labour supply behaviour. The new scenario provides for a ﬁxed
commencement date at which the pension fund starts to pay beneﬁts, independent from the
agents’ labour supply behaviour. In this simulation, agents begin to receive second-tier pension
beneﬁts at age 60.62 From that age onwards agents stop paying pension premiums and stop
building up pension rights.
Incentives
Given that the ﬁxed age at which agents start to receive pension beneﬁts is 60 years, some agents
start to receive beneﬁts later than in the base scenario (especially groups with large variable
costs), while others start to receive beneﬁts at an earlier age (groups with small variable costs).
These changes in the pension scheme imply several changes in the effective wage rate since
features of the pension scheme (for instance, pension premiums, promised beneﬁts, relative yield
on pension wealth) are part of this wage rate. Furthermore, this new pension scheme implies the
removal of the labour supply constraint, that is, the obligation to quit your main job in order to
receive pension beneﬁts.
The ﬁrst and most obvious change in the effective wage rate is caused by the forward or
backward shift in the commencement date which affects the amount of pension rights and
corresponding pension beneﬁts. Such a shift, for example, changes the time span in which
pension rights are built up.
Second, age related tax rates cause of a change in the effective wage rate. After all, due to
different tax rates before and after age 65, a shift of the commencement date may affect net
pension beneﬁts. That is, (gross) pension beneﬁts that are received between 60 and 65 are taxed
more heavily than beneﬁts received after 65.
A third, quite hidden, cause of a change in the effective wage rate is the change in the relative
utility of pension savings compared to private savings. This relative utility depends, among other
things, on the difference between the (tax-free) net yield on pension wealth and (taxed) net yield
on private ﬁnancial wealth. A change in the commencement date, then, reduces or extends the
62 First tier pension beneﬁts start at age 65.
63period of tax-free pension wealth accumulation. Moreover, in contrast to pension rights, paid
pension beneﬁts are available to allocate among consumption, leisure and bequests. In this
respect the ﬁxed commencement date changes the relative utility of pension savings with respect
to private savings too. Independent of the reasons behind the changes in the effective wage rate,
changes in the effective wage rate result in both an income effect and a substitution effect.
The removal of the link between labour supply behaviour and the beneﬁt commencement
date on the one hand offers the possibility to continue to supply labour in the main job. In the
baseline pension scheme one of the incentives to retire from the main job is that retirement gives
access to your pension income. The removal of this incentive logically may result in later
retirement. On the other hand, the removal of the link between labour supply behaviour and the
beneﬁt commencement date also offers the possibility to delay the commencement date, and
beneﬁt from the tax advantages, without having to extend labour supply.
Aggregate effects
The pension scheme with a ﬁxed commencement date at age 60 leads to a fall in labour supply,
in particular at the extensive margin (see table 5.4 and ﬁgure 5.14 before age 65). The average
Table 5.4 Economic effects of a ﬁxed commencement date
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force − 0.7
Labour supply (%) − 0.6
Consumption (%) − 0.1
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) − 0.3
Government budget (bln, abs dif) − 2.1
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) 5.8
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.1
Participation rate (%-point) − 0.1
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) − 6.0
Participation rate (%-point) − 8.3
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) − 15.7
Participation rate (%-point) − 6.2
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) 4.7
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) 24.8
Participation rate (%-point) 0.6
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retirement age drops by almost eight months (see table 5.4). Especially labour supply between
55 and 65 falls, while a small increase occurs after age 65 (see ﬁgure 5.13). Total consumption is
almost stable as the increase in post-65 consumption offsets the fall in pre-65 consumption. Like
the simulations in the previous sections, these outcomes are the net result of different
behavioural responses of different groups and at different stages during the life cycle.
Up to the commencement date of second-tier pension beneﬁts, the macroeconomic effect on
labour supply, consumption and private ﬁnancial wealth is the result of opposite effects at
underlying groups. For instance, individuals with very large variable costs retire at around 55-57
years of age due to the infeasibility of the minimum hours requirement and the size of the
variable costs, given the total available time. Because the ﬁxed commencement date does not
relieve this infeasibility, these individuals face a delay of pension beneﬁts without the possibility
to extend their working life. Consequently, they have to ﬁnance the time span between
retirement and receipt of pension beneﬁts by own savings (higher private ﬁnancial wealth). In
this respect the shift of the commencement date of second-tier pension beneﬁts deteriorates the
allocation of funds. Compared to the baseline pension scheme, forced pension savings become
65Reallocations of individuals with small variable costs in response to ﬁxed commencement date
Compared to the baseline, the new pension scheme implies a forward shift in the commencement date (mostly from 65 to
60), which implies a reduction in the accrual of pension rights. This lowers the net effective wage rate before age 60. On
the other hand, this forward shift makes pension beneﬁts available earlier in time to be used for consumption, leisure and
bequests. This improves the relative utility of pension savings with respect to private savings, increasing the net effective
wage rate. In this case the latter effect dominates the results: the effective wage rate increases. This gives rise to an
income effect and an intratemporal substitution effect. As the substitution effect dominates, leisure falls, while consumption
and labour supply increase.
Furthermore, the forward shift in the receipt of pension payments implies less private savings in order to smooth consump-
tion in times of lower income (due to annual increases in variable costs after age 50).
Depending on the baseline retirement age, the effective wage rate also changes after the commencement date as the
building up of pension rights ends. In most cases this results in a fall in the effective wage rate and a corresponding
reduction in labour supply. However, in the baseline some individuals with small variable costs retire somewhere between
60 and 65 in order to attain their pension beneﬁts. As this labour constraint is now removed, some of these individuals
choose to delay retirement from their main job. This results in a higher lifetime income and a corresponding upward shift
in consumption. This opposes the aforementioned downward effect of the real wage rate.
In addition to these two effects, the fact that the effective wage rate falls during ages 60-65 and rises between 25 and 60
implies the existence of an intertemporal substitution effect. This amounts to (slightly) more labour supply in advance of
the new commencement date and less labour supply thereafter (ages 60-65).
Finally, in order to smooth consumption after age 60, a part of the received pension beneﬁts and additional labour earnings
is saved, implying that private ﬁnancial wealth increases from 60 till 64 years of age.
After the statutory retirement age of 65 and compared to the baseline scenario, the annual amount of pension beneﬁts
is reduced due to the prolongend period of pension payments and the reduced period of building up the pension rights.
Compared to the baseline in which income after retirement is signiﬁcantly higher than income before retirement, this results
- despite of some additional savings between 60 and 65 years - in less consumption and leisure after retirement.
less attractive and so the effective wage rate is lower up to the age of withdrawal from the labour
market. The delay in the beneﬁt commencement date without an associated extension of
working life (as in the baseline scenario), in addition, raises net pension beneﬁts due to the tax
advantages. This gives rise to an income effect, raising consumption and leisure. Overall, in this
period, consumption and labour supply (intensive and extensive margin) fall. On the other hand,
individuals that retire from their ﬁrst job between 60 and 65, increase their labour supply in
reaction to a rise in their effective wage rate as the early start of second-tier pension beneﬁts
implies additional funds to allocate among consumption and bequest. In this respect the new
pension scheme is more favourable than the baseline scheme. The forced early commencement
date reduces the accrual of pension rights and yields a negative income effect. Furthermore,
private savings are reduced as additional pension funds will be available at age 60 to compensate
the expected drop in labour supply after the gradual increase of variable labour costs. The net
effect of increased labour supply and less savings is a small rise in consumption up to age 60.
The macroeconomic effects on labour supply during the time span 60 - 65 years are entirely
66Reallocations of individuals with large variable costs in response to ﬁxed commencement date
Individuals with the largest variable costs retire due to the infeasibility of time constraint, minimum hours constraint and
variable costs. To continue working beyond the current retirement age is no option. The new commencement date,
therefore, requires additional savings to bridge the time span between retirement and new commencement date. In this
way the pension scheme distorts an optimal allocation of consumption and leisure over the life cycle. This results in a
small fall in the effective wage rate and so a fall in labour supply (hours worked) and less consumption in advance of the
withdrawal from the labour market.
After retirement, labour supply is nil and consumption is funded by private ﬁnancial wealth until the commencement date
of the pension scheme. Thereafter, pension beneﬁts are also used to consume. However, as the altered pension scheme
distorts the optimal life-cycle allocation of consumption, consumption increases after the retirement age. Until age 65, the
rise in consumption is accompanied by a fall in private ﬁnancial wealth. At the age 64, private ﬁnancial wealth is below its
baseline value. After age 65 and the start of ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts, savings increase in order to restore the amount of
private ﬁnancial wealth almost to its baseline value.
caused by groups with smaller variable costs. In this period the net effect on the effective wage
rate of the new pension scheme is negative. The loss of the accrual of pension rights is larger
than the impact of the reduction of the pension beneﬁts and the more favourable availability of
funds. In response to the fall in the effective wage rate, labour supply drops at the extensive and
intensive margin. Simultaneously, consumption falls and savings increase. On the other hand,
consumption of individuals with large variable costs start to increase after age 60, while savings
fall between ages 60-54. The increase in consumption is caused by the rise in lifetime income
after age 60. Compared to the baseline, this income increases as second-tier pension beneﬁts are
paid during a shorter period. The fall in private savings is caused by an unbalance in the annual
ﬂows within the post-60 period. As the baseline pension scheme incorporates ﬁrst-tier pension
beneﬁts and results in a ﬁxed amount of total pension beneﬁts after retirement, the new pension
scheme raises total annual pension beneﬁts after the commencement date of ﬁrst-tier pensions.
At age 65 individuals start to receive their ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts. As just described,
individuals with large variable costs increase their private savings in this period in order to
restore private ﬁnancial wealth to its baseline value at age 99. Individuals with small variable
costs face a fall in total post-65 income as a part of second-tier pension beneﬁts is already
received. The drop in (residual) lifetime income results in less consumption and less leisure, and
so an increase in labour supply at the intensive and extensive margin.
Looking at the effects on the government budget and the total cash ﬂow of pension funds, the
government budget deteriorates as the tax base falls. The shift forward of the payment of
second-tier pension beneﬁts improves the total cash ﬂow of pension funds. The reduced accrual
of pension rights is exceeded by the yield on pension wealth.
675.6 Free choice
The default pension scheme relates the commencement of pension beneﬁts to quitting the ﬁrst
job, while pension funds impose the amount of these beneﬁts – consisting of a ﬁxed yearly
annuity. In order to assess the impact on labour market participation of a more ﬂexible pension
scheme, we introduce a pension scheme without the link between quitting the main job and
receiving pension beneﬁts and with the opportunity for the individual to choose the amount of
pension beneﬁts between 60 and 65 years. It is not allowed to receive pension beneﬁts before
age 60. In agreement with Dutch institutions, the chosen levels of pension beneﬁts are limited to
70% of average labour income, and the sum of current labour income and current pension
beneﬁts is not allowed to exceed the average labour income until age 60. After age 65 the
assumed pension scheme returns an actuarial-fair ﬁxed annuity.63
Incentives
Compared to the baseline, the new pension scheme gives the opportunity to simultaneously
supply labour in the main job and receive pension beneﬁts between 60 and 65 years, to cope with
the increasing variable costs. This combination allows people to acquire lower private ﬁnancial
wealth to smooth consumption and, consequently, raise their consumption level and reduce
labour supply, prior to age 60. However, within the new pension scheme, one may also choose to
ﬁrst quit the main job and postpone the receipt of pension beneﬁts. Such a delay would be
beneﬁcial for two reasons. First, compared to private savings, the yield of pension savings is
higher due to the ﬁscal exemption of interest income and the reallocation of wealth of deceased
participants among the survivors.64 The second reason concerns the difference in tax rates before
and after age 65, resulting in higher net pension beneﬁts if received after age 65. Such a strategy
requires additional savings before age 60 in order to smooth consumption in the period between
quitting the labour force and receiving pension beneﬁts. Or in other words: less consumption and
more labour supply. Whichever choice they make concerning their pension commencement date,
before or after the moment of quitting their main job, individuals who in the baseline started to
receive pensions before age 60 are now forced to delay pension receipt to at least age 60.




   
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= 0 if t < 60
≤ wlt −wt(Rret)lt if t ≥ 60 and < 65
≤ 0.7wt(Rret)lt if t ≥ 60 and < 65
= G−1
t65 apt65−1 if t ≥ 65
(5.1)
64 This gap between yield on pension wealth and private wealth implies higher pension beneﬁts if the commencement
date is postponed.
68Aggregate effects
Looking at the results for labour supply ﬁgure 5.17 and ﬁgure 5.18 show a drop in labour supply,
especially at the extensive margin before age 65. Total labour supply falls about 0.7% and in full
time equivalents about 0.3% (see table 5.5). Like previous simulations, these ﬁgures describe the
total effect of responses of different groups. In this simulation reallocations of individuals with
large variable costs largely explain the macroeconomic results.65 These individuals face a shift
of the commencement date of their pensions up to at least age 60 and have to consider an
expensive (in terms of lifetime income) early start of the beneﬁts at age 60 and an expensive (in
terms of reduced bequests up to age 65) of a postponement of the beneﬁts up to age 65. In this
simulation, these individuals prefer to postpone their pension beneﬁts to age 65 (with an
exception at age 63, see below).
Table 5.5 Economic effects of pension scheme including free choice between 60 and 65 years
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force − 0.8
Labour supply (%) − 0.7
Consumption (%) 1.0
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) − 0.3
Government budget (bln, abs dif) − 2.8
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) 6.0
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) − 0.1
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) − 6.1
Participation rate (%-point) − 8.3
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) − 12.1
Participation rate (%-point) − 6.2
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) 0.0
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) 0.0
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
65 Groups with small variable costs do not alter their life-cycle allocation of consumption and leisure as – in the baseline –
they quit their main job and start to receive pension beneﬁts at age 65. A shift forward of pension funds would reduce their
lifetime income as 1) the tax rate on pre-65 income exceeds the tax rate of post-65 income and 2) the yield on pension
wealth exceeds the yield on private ﬁnancial wealth due to the tax exemption and the redistribution of pension wealth of
deceased participants.
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Between ages 55 and 65, current income is below its value in the baseline due to postponed
pension beneﬁts. So, savings are used for consumption, resulting in a lower level of private
ﬁnancial wealth at the end of this period.
Up to age 55, the lower levels of private ﬁnancial wealth at later ages and associated higher
levels of marginal utility of bequests reduce the effective wage rate up to the retirement age and
lead to a fall in both labour supply and consumption. The reduction in the effective wage rate
shifts the optimum of working at the minimum hours constraint towards an earlier retirement,
lowering the participation rate. The decline in consumption exceeds the decline in labour income
to realize a higher level of private ﬁnancial wealth at age 55.
After age 65, current income rises (caused by higher pension beneﬁts), implying that
consumption and savings exceed their baseline values. The additional savings ultimately result
in a slightly higher level of private ﬁnancial wealth, expressing the increased lifetime income
caused by higher (net) pension beneﬁts.
Figures 5.17-5.19 show a spike at age 63. Only at that age, many types of individuals ask for
70some pension beneﬁts. In our data, the mortality rates – which are based on CBS data – show a
sharp increase at age 63 and so alter signiﬁcantly the return on pension wealth and – compared
to other years – the weight of bequests in lifetime utility. If a ﬁxed and constant mortality rate is
assumed, this spike disappears.
Above results are dominated by the structure of the tax system. In particular, if post-65 and
pre-65 income taxes are equalized and the tax exemption on the yield on pension wealth is
abolished, almost all individuals (also individuals with small variable costs) will choose to
receive pension beneﬁts at ages 60 or 61, and retire one year earlier. Again, labour supply falls.
But in contrast to the preceding results, consumption falls due to a reduced net lifetime income
caused by lower pension beneﬁts and income taxation.
The drop in labour supply and therefore in labour income reduces tax receipts of the government.
This leads to a fall in the government deﬁcit. The total cash ﬂow of pension funds improves as
some groups extend their labour supply (at the extensive margin) in order to tide over the period
between the ’old’ age of receiving pension beneﬁts in the baseline and the current age.
5.7 Delayed retirement credit
In this section, we focus on the effects of a more ﬂexible ﬁrst-tier pension scheme. In the
baseline, ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts start at the imposed age of 65 years independent from
retirement. In current simulation the commencement date of these ﬁrst-tier pensions is equal to
the retirement age if the retirement age exceeds 65 years. As the baseline simulation contains a
statutory retirement age of 65 years, we have to shift the statutory retirement age in the simlation
too.66 We assume a new statutory retirement age at 70 years. Furthermore, we introduce a
premium for each year of participation in the ﬁrst job after 65 year. First, and inspired by the
Dutch policy debate, we impose a premium of 5% and show that - compared to the effects of a
shift in the statutory retirement age, negative effects on labour supply of this premium will
appear.67
Incentives
A simulation including a premium on participation above 65 years must contain a shift in the
statutory retirement age too. So, compared to the baseline, this simulation consists of two
impulses. First, a shift in the statutory retirement age. In this simulation we shift this age
towards 70 years. Second, a premium for extended labour force participation.
66 Otherwise, nobody is able to use the delayed ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts.
67 In contrast to the policy proposals this simulation assumes a link between receiving the premium and the prolonged
participation in the labour market.
71As more extensively described in section 5.3, the shift in the statutory retirement age
increases labour supply as better paid (ﬁrst) jobs are longer available. Furthermore, the decline
in the wage rate of the second job starts a few years later and so, after quitting the ﬁrst job, the
wage rate of the second job exceeds its baseline value in the next 15 years. So, a rise of the
effective wage rate after age 65 appears.
The premium on the delayed ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁt affects the lifetime income and
life-cycle pattern of private ﬁnancial wealth. The change in lifetime income depends on the size
of the premium, the interest rate and tax rates. A rough estimate of the actuarial fair premium is
about 9%. Next, postponement of the ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁt reduces private ﬁnancial wealth
after the age of 64 years for a long period and so reduces lifetime utility associated to the bequest
motive. This will result in a downward effect on the effective wage rate.
Aggregate effects
In order to describe and understand the aggregate effects of delayed retirement credit, we will
start with a brieﬂy description of the effects of a shift in the statutory retirement age (ﬁrst
column of table 5.6). As already described in section 5.3, this shift encourages labour supply of
Table 5.6 Economic effects of delayed retirement credit
(1) (2)
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force 0.2 0.1
Labour supply (%) 0.2 0.2
Consumption (%) 0.6 0.3
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) 0.2 0.1
Government budget (bln, abs dif) 0.2 0.5
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) − 1.0 − 1.3
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.1 0.0
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0 0.0
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.2 − 0.1
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0 0.0
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.8 − 0.5
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0 0.0
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) 76.7 54.3
Participation rate (%-point) 0.8 0.0
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) 97.4 109.6
Participation rate (%-point) 1.8 1.8
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the groups with small variable costs after 65 years. In contrast to groups with large variable
costs, they are not yet restricted by the time constraint, minimum hours constraint and the size of
their variabele costs. The opportunity to keep their better paid ﬁrst job after achieving their 65th
anniversary results in a larger labour supply in hours during 65 - 70 years. Thereafter, the wage
rate of the second job exceeds its baseline value as the depreciation is related to the wage rate in
last year at the ﬁrst job. This leads to an increase in hours worked and ﬁnally in an increase in
the participation rate at older ages. The increased labour income (and so lifetime income) results
in a rise in consumption, an improvement of the government balance and ﬁnancial wealth of
pension funds. In advance of 65 years intertemporal substitution caused by increase in the wage
rate after 65 years, leads to a decline in labour supply before 65 years.
Compared to the effects of the shift in the statutory retirement age, the combination of a shift
in the statutory retirement age and a premium on postponed ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts results in
an almost identical increase in labour supply (see second column of table 5.6). Looking at the
average lifetime labour supply, the introduced premium results in a smaller increase. In the case
of a 5% premium, the premium does not compensate the loss in lifetime utility by a cut in private
73ﬁnancial wealth at and after 65 years. For some groups, the fall in private ﬁnancial wealth
caused by postponed ﬁrst-tier beneﬁts results in an increase in the marginal utility of private
ﬁnancial wealth and so a lower effective wage rate.68. The lower effective wage rate leads to an
intertemporal and an intratemporal substitution effect. The intertemporal results in a reallocation
to more work after 65 years and less labour supply in advance. The intratemporal substitution
effect results in more leisure and less consumption before 65 years. The, compared to only a
shift in the statutory retirement age, reduced labour supply results in a smaller increase in
consumption and a slightly lower total cash ﬂow of pension funds. Looking at the government
balance, the fall in paid ﬁrst-tier pension beneﬁts reduces the government transfers and that
exceeds the negative impact on government (tax) income of the reduced labour supply.
5.8 Balanced budget simulations
Introduction
All simulations presented in the previous sections are open budget analyses, i.e. (ﬁnancial)
effects on the government budget and/or the total cash ﬂow of pension funds are not redistributed
among households through changes in tax rates or pension premiums. For some issues, however,
balanced budget simulations may be more relevant. But from the perspective of a model with
heterogeneous households it is not evident how a balanced budget simulation should be deﬁned.
One approach is to aim at a balanced budget for a particular group. This approach will neutralize
the income effects, but will necessarily result in different tax rates and/or pension premiums for
different groups. From an institutional point of view a rather odd result.
The other approach is to balance the budgets at a macroeconomic level. This will guarantee
uniform tax rates and pension premiums, but will not neutralize income effects as this approach
contains redistribution of income between groups.
In this section, we limit our analysis to providing the tools to manage the second approach of
balanced-budget simulations. Tools, as in this model the outcomes in case of a balanced budget
simulation are nearly equal to the sum of the outcomes of an open budget simulation and a
separate income tax and/or pension premium simulation. This ﬁnding leads us to limit our
balanced budget discussion to the presentation of these two additional simulations.
68 In particular groups with middle sized variable costs. Groups with large variable costs are not able to extend their
period of labour force participation and so do not alter their labour supply in response to the shift in the statutory
retirement age and the premium. Moreover, groups with small variable costs hardly reallocate their life-cycle labour supply
in response to the premium. If they quit at age 65, the loss of labour income and so private ﬁnancial wealth at that and
successive ages exceeds the value of the ﬁrst-tier pension in these years.
74A cut in the tax rate on income
A cut of 1%-point in the (proportional) tax rate increases the net effective wage rate. This
induces both an income effect and an (intratemporal) substitution effect. According to the
substitution effect both labour supply and consumption increase. The income effect, as lifetime
income is higher, causes higher levels of consumption and leisure, and hence a lower level of
labour supply. Without the presence of age-dependent taxes, non-labour taxable income and
borrowing constraints, these two effects imply that consumption increases, while the net effect
on labour supply depends on the relative strenths of the income and substitution effects.
Because the model contains age-dependent tax rates69, the relative effect of the cut in the tax
rate on the effective wage rate differs between age-groups. This difference leads to a small
intertemporal substitution effect. Moreover, the model contains non-labour taxable income,
giving rise to an additional income effect. Finally, the presence of a bequest motive reduces the
reallocation over time.
Table 5.7 Economic effects of a cut in the tax rate on labour income
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force 0.0
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Consumption (%) 1.2
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) 0.1
Government budget (bln, abs dif) − 8.7
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) 0.0
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) 0.7
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) 1.8
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
69 The turning point is 65 years.
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As shown in table 5.7, the cut in the tax rate induces a small increase in labour supply and an
increase in consumption of more than 1%. Both the average age of quitting the labour force and
the participation rate (see ﬁgure 5.26) are unaffected. This is mainly the result of the largely
age-independent nature of this policy change and the relatively small impulse.
As ﬁgures 5.25 and 5.27 show, the largest effects of the tax reduction occur at those stages in the
life cycle in which all agents work. This reﬂects both the decline in the population and the fact
that the impact of the change in the tax rate on both labour supply and consumption is lower
after (full) retirement (on labour supply the impact after retirement is actually zero). For all
types of individuals the income effect translates in more consumption, more leisure and less
hours worked, while the substitution effect leads to more consumption, less leisure and more
hours worked. Finally, the intertemporal substitution effect results in less time spent on leisure
before age 65, and more time spent on leisure thereafter. As the elasticity of intratemporal
substitution (σ) is larger than 1, the substitution effect dominates the income effect, implying
increases in consumption, a reduced demand for leisure and higher levels of labour supply.
76Individuals who retire before 65 face an increase in their net wage rate and consequently raise
their labour supply by way of raising their hours worked. Participation remains unaltered. The
corresponding increase in lifetime income is used to raise their level of consumption over the
whole life cycle. To compensate the lower levels of leisure during their working life, however,
consumption during working life is raised more than consumption during retirement. These
individuals increase their level of wealth (see ﬁgure 5.28) for two purposes. One is to ﬁnance
their higher levels of consumption later in life. The other purpose is to leave a higher amount of
wealth as bequest. The higher bequest is driven by their higher lifetime income.
Individuals who continue to work after age 65 face a similar increase in net wages before 65,
but in addition experience a relatively higher increase in their net wage rate after 65.70 This
induces them to raise their hours worked more than in the pre-65 period – induced both by a
higher impulse and by an intertemporal reallocation, which consists of a shift of hours worked
from the pre-65 period to the post-65 period. Again, consumption is raised over the whole life
cycle and more so during working life. All these individuals raise their wealth level in response
of the tax cut. This extra wealth is primarily used for bequest purposes, though some of it is used
for smoothing purposes to ﬁnance part-time work. Income after 65 is used to ﬁnance
consumption after 65 and additionally accumulate wealth for bequest purpose. These higher
bequest needs tend to lower the increase in consumption after 65.
A cut in the pension premium rate
Naturally, responses to a decrease in the pension premium 1%-point are close to the responses to
the fall in the income tax as descibed above. The main differences are that
1. A change in the pension premium has no effect on transfer income
2. Pension premiums are only paid until retirement from the main job
Taken into account these differences, the income effects of a change in the tax rate are not
present here, while the gap between the net effective wage rate before and after retirement falls if
the pension premium is reduced. Compared to the results of the cut in the tax rate, the different
development of labour supply (compare ﬁgures 5.25 and 5.29) is largely the result of the smaller
gap, giving rise to a (stronger) intertemporal dimension. Compared to the baseline, the cut in the
pension premium labour supply induces an intertemporal substitution, shifting labour supply
from the second to the ﬁrst job. 71
Comparing the macroeconomic outcomes between the cut in the income tax and the cut in
the pension premium, the simulations show hardly any differences (compare tables 5.7 and 5.8).
70 The effect on the net wage rate is relatively higher after (and including) age 65, because the 1%-point reduction of the
tax rate concerns a lower tax rate after 65. This constitutes a higher relative change.
71 See ﬁgure 5.29 where the change in labour supply gradually falls and labour supply is below its baseline value at age
65. Thereafter, the gap between simulation and baseline reduces as labour supply converges to nil.
77Table 5.8 Economic effects of a cut in the pension premium
Macroeconomic results
Average age of quitting the labour force 0.0
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Consumption (%) 0.6
Average lifetime labour supply (fte, abs dif) 0.1
Government budget (bln, abs dif) 3.1
Cash ﬂow of pension funds (bln, abs dif) − 77.2
Age cohort results
Age group 25 - 54 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 55 - 59 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 60 - 64 years
Labour supply (%) 0.2
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 65 - 69 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.5
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
Age group 70 - 74 years
Labour supply (%) − 0.7
Participation rate (%-point) 0.0
The macroeconomic effects on labour supply are very similar. The increase in consumption is
smaller due to smaller income effects. In contrast to the cut in the income tax, the government
budget improves because of smaller expenditure for tax-deductable pension premiums. The total
cash ﬂow of pension funds deteriorates signiﬁcantly as the assigned pension beneﬁts hardly
change in the deﬁned beneﬁts scheme, while the received pension premiums substantially fall.
5.9 Concluding remarks
The preceding sections describe a number of policy simulations. The policy simulations show
how the different (sub)groups behave, both individually and in the aggregate, in response to a
change in policy. For example, if the Social Security premium exemption of the elderly would be
eliminated, the model predicts that the average age of quitting the labour force would decrease
with almost four months. Likewise, total labour supply would fall with 0.2%, while total
consumption would fall with well over 1%. To properly assess these results, we have to keep in
mind the partial nature of the model, and the set of simplifying assumptions.
Compared to the version of November 2007 we extended the model with a government
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budget constraint and a budget constraint for the pension funds. This enables us to conduct
balanced-budget exercises. An additional advantage of this, as mentioned before, is that a
balanced budget effectively removes the income effects, which are empirically hard to quantify.
We also improved upon the empirical foundation of the model. Unfortunately, as the retirement
data of 2005 were not yet available (in March 2008), we are still using the 2004 data.
The current results give an indication of the desired change in behaviour of households in the
economy, in which the employers do not play an active role – for instance, apart from a
minimum amount, the employees are free to choose any amount of hours they wish to supply.
Moreover, there is still a fair amount of uncertainty about many parameters of the model.
Finally, at this stage of constructing and analysing the properties of the model, we also
simpliﬁed the model. For instance, at this stage we ignored the inﬂuence of empirically-founded
wage proﬁles, unemployment, and the like.
79806 Agenda for future research
At this point, we identify several avenues to improve the life-cycle model in the future. In order
to reﬁne the policies’ impact on the retirement date, we may shorten the length of a period in the
model to one month. Additionally, to take account of the restrictions that workers face if they
want to reduce work effort, we may further restrict the hours worked decision.
Further, we may extend the degree of heterogeneity of the model. We can think of several
directions in which it may be worthwile to extend the model. One direction concerns the level of
the wage rate, or education level. In the current setting, all individuals earn the same gross wage
rate. This may potentially overstate the income effect (e.g. of changes in Social Security).
Moreover, having agents of different income levels, for example high and low income, allows us
to differentiate the policies’ impacts with respect to income levels. Another dimension of
heterogeneity is to include family labour supply. The current population of the model consists of
one-person households only. Extending the household to include two persons (possibly with
children) may bring in important interactions between family members. This may be particularly
important to describe female labour supply. Another approach to capture the different retirement
patterns of women compared to men is to separately calibrate the model for men and women. A
third potential direction of heterogeneity that may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the results is the
pension system. In particular, we think of access to the early retirement scheme. As shown in the
simulation concerning the introduction of an early retirement scheme, if such a scheme is
available for everyone, almost everyone will consequently take it. Therefore, to capture both
groups of people, the one that retires through the early retirement scheme and the one that does
not, we need to differentiate with respect to (the eligibility of) the early retirement scheme.
Finally, we may consider heterogeneity with respect to the past, i.e. to realized levels of wealth.
Last but not least, the ongoing development of behavioural economics provides challenges to
incorporate these insights in a proper description of labour supply, retirement and consumption.
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